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ABSTRACT
COMPETITION AMONG HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPALS OP CHARTER SCHOOLS,
PUBLIC SCHOOLS, AND VOUCHER-RECEIVING PRIVATE SCHOOLS IN THE
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MAY 2006
BONNIE JEAN CAIN, B.A., OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY
M.A., COLLEGE OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
DOCTOR OF EDUCATION, UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Kathryn A. McDermott
This study explored the conditions of competition that are implicit in the idea
that market-based school reform will improve schools. The research was conducted in
Washington, D.C., which provides three theoretically competing schooling options to its
public students: the traditional, publicly managed public school system; publicly
financed but privately managed charter schools; and the D.C. voucher program, which
pays private-school tuition with public funds. Based on interviews with high school
principals directing the three types of schools, the study found minimal competition
among the types of schools. While all the principals were committed to school choice,
there actually was little rivalry among the three types of high school principals. The
majority of the principals actually knew little about and felt minimal impact from the
other types of high schools. While recruitment of families and students is a major
measurement of competition, the study could not find a connection between the level of
enrollment and the recruitment efforts of the principals or the quality of information
they provided potential families and students. The study also focused on structural
issues that could explain the minimal competition among the three types of schools and
vi
concluded that, during the period of the study, they were not designed to compete and
did not perceive strong incentives to do so.
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CHAPTER 1
COMPETITION AND HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPALS WHO SERVE D.C.
PUBLIC STUDENTS
Introduction
More than four decades of debate over the wisdom of introducing competition
into America s education systems has produced greater choice in school options, but
very possibly less competition than most theorists believe. One side in the debate
argues that competition will bring the efficiencies of the free enterprise system to public
education: schools will compete for students and either flourish or, if they fail to attract
and retain students, close their doors. The other side contends that education is a public
service, not commerce, and that cooperation, planning, and close monitoring are more
critical than competition to providing equitable public education. The debate has been
both theoretical and political, with few participants focused on how competition
actually manifests itself among schools serving public students.
Now, after 10 years of growth in school choice and with the traditional, publicly
directed schools challenged by charter schools and voucher programs in most U.S.
cities, the need to understand how competition is actually functioning takes on new
importance. The market-based school reform is predicated on efficiencies believed to
be present in the business model of competition and the assumption that this
competition will be played out through the recruitment and retention of students and
families to specific schools that have the desired characteristics and programs. Another
implicit assumption is that there will be information on which students and families
base their choices and that this information will be part of the recruitment process. Yet,
in the District of Columbia, where one of the nation s largest experiments in school
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choice is ongoing, there is little research into or oversight and monitoring of the actual
nature of the competition between types of schools and how that competition is
expressed in the recruitment practices of the various types of schools.
This study was designed to answer questions about the nature and strength of
competition among the array of schools serving public students in Washington, D.C. It
explores whether these schools act like competitors and whether that competition leads
the schools to provide the kind of information families need in order to make reasoned
choices.
The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of competition among the
principals of three types of schools serving D.C. public high school students and how
this competition or lack of competition affects the way these principals use information.
The study asks:
1 ) Do the principals see themselves in competition with other types of high
schools?
2) Do the principals feel a need to increase enrollment and what do they see as
consequences of low enrollment?
3) What are their recruitment strategies?
4) Does their use of information materials reflect their need to recruit?
Data was gathered through interviews with principals or head administrators
from each of the three types of schools to determine how principals were thinking about
these issues. The study also analyzed the schools recruitment information and web
sites in order to answer theses questions.
The intention of this study is to contribute to the body of knowledge about the
connection between competition and school reform.
Background
The study chose the District of Columbia because it houses one of the largest
experiments in school choice and market-based school reform in the nation. Today,
over 24% of the District s public students are enrolled in charter schools and more than
1,200 public students receive vouchers to attend private and parochial schools. The
D.C. Public Schools (DCPS) continues to educate most of the more than 54,700 D.C.
public school students. Furthermore, Congress has invested hundreds of millions of
dollars in the introduction and expansion of the charter schools and the D.C. voucher
program. Congress, along with school-choice advocates, has justified its support of
these initiatives by asserting that competition will cause school reform and that the
experience of Washington, D.C., could serve as at least a partial model for other U.S.
cities.
The market-based school reform experiments began in earnest in the District 10
years ago (D.C. School Reform Act, 1995) when Congress required the District to
authorize and fund independent schools. The expectation was that these charter schools
would operate on market principles. They would compete for public students, provide
better education because of that competition, and close if not performing well.
Proponents argued that an effective set of charter schools competing with the
traditional, centralized public school system would cause both types of schools to
improve.
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Expanding the experiment to include vouchers in 2003 (D.C. School Choice
Incentive Act, 2003), Congress required the District to offer public students federally
funded vouchers to attend private and parochial schools to showcase the efficiencies of
allowing parents to freely choose among a variety of educational offerings. The stated
legislative purpose was to provide low-income D.C. parents, particularly parents of
students who attend elementary schools or secondary schools identified for
improvement, corrective action, or restructuring under section 1 1 16 of the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 6316), with expanded opportunities
for enrolling their children in higher-performing schools in the District of Columbia
(D.C. School Choice Incentive Act, Sec. 303, 2003). However, the voucher
administrators were also required to evaluate annually, . .
.
(B) The success of the
programs in expanding choice options for parents. . .
.
(E) The impact of the program
on students, and public elementary schools and secondary schools, in the District of
Columbia (D.C. School Choice Incentive, Sec. 309, 2003). The implication was that
choice expansion would pressure or influence in some way the performance of the
public schools. Interestingly, there appeared to be no desire to pressure or influence the
performance of other private schools.
Purpose and Design of the Study
The purpose of this study is to explore how competition works, i.e., whether the
assumptions implicit in the idea that choice will improve schools are valid. To do this,
the researcher chose to study the functioning of competition among D.C. high schools
that receive public funds; specifically, whether schools act as competitors and whether
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that competition causes schools to provide the kind of information families need in
order to make reasoned choices.
In order to explore the nature and impact of inter-institutional competition, the
study explores the attitudes and thinking of 16 D.C. high school principals about school
choice and competition and their actions as they recruited students. Two of these
principals directed private high schools participating in the D.C. voucher program. 6
directed charter high schools, and 8 directed DCPS high schools. The principals were
interviewed to determine their thoughts and attitudes about school choice and
competition; their response to the enrollment requirements of their schools; their
approach to recruitment; and their use of information in the recruitment process. The
questions focused on whether the principals saw their schools in competition with other
types of high schools, whether they felt a need to increase enrollment, what they saw as
consequences of low enrollment, and what their recruitment strategies were. All
principals interviewed were asked to provide copies of the materials they used for
recruitment and for informing families and students about the school s performance and
programs. They also provided the URL of their web sites.
At the same time, a document search was made to determine the impact of
federal intervention in support of charter schools and the D.C. voucher program on the
quality of competition among the high schools serving public students.
Significance of the Study
Over the last 10 years, public schooling options have increased enonnously in
most urban centers, but nowhere more than in the District of Columbia. Researchers
have begun to evaluate the impact of the availability of these multiple schooling options
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in the District by studying academic performance differentials among the types of
schools. Researchers also have studied whether charter schools have attracted more
educationally disadvantaged students than DCPS schools have enrolled. However, little
research has focused on whether the rationale for market-based education reform that
competition would cause school reform has held. Nor has there been research to
determine the nature of competition between types of schools. This study contributes to
the research that explores the relationship or connection between competition and
improved educational practices and outcomes.
Framing Insight of the Study
The full results of the study are reported in Chapters 6 and 7. However, the
initial interviews provide insights that guided the study s approach.
First, all the principals interviewed thought that choice had positive aspects and
that parents had a right to a variety of schooling options. Because they expressed
almost equal enthusiasm for promoting increased alternatives, the researcher concluded
that it would not be possible to draw conclusions based on the principals varying levels
of commitment to choice.
Second, the principals appeared to be experiencing little competition from any
of the other types of schools; rather, they reported little awareness of or reaction to the
high schools with which they theoretically compete. Five of the 8 DCPS principals
interviewed could not name a charter school, while only 2 out of 6 charter-school
principals felt any competition with DCPS. None of the DCPS and charter-school
principals had any knowledge of the voucher-receiving private schools. The 2 private-
school principals interviewed reported that they felt no competition from either DCPS
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or charter schools. Charter, DCPS, and voucher-receiving high school principals
reported an almost total isolation from each other.
A third insight was that the mission and structure of the voucher program, the
charter schools, and DCPS minimize or work against competition among the types of
schools. For example, DCPS mission requires it to educate all students within the
boundaries of the District, while the charter schools are obligated to educate only the
students enrolled in their programs and the D.C. voucher program is required to enroll
only the public students in the participating private or parochial private schools. There
is enormous variation in the level of independence allowed the different types of
schools. Furthermore, variations in access to funding, federal support, requirements for
reporting performance, and consequences for poor performance are so large that these
differences needed to be reported.
Absent competition between types of high schools, the principals did report
competition with their own type of school. For example, DCPS high school principals
stated that they compete with other high schools within DCPS; they noted in particular
competition between neighborhood schools and so-called specialized schools, which
requires students to meet specific qualifications for acceptance. Similarly, some
charter-school principals reported competing with other charter high schools.
Competition versus recruitment: just a nicer word?
The majority of the principals expressed discomfort with the word
competition and other market terminology. However, all thought that having a
diversity of education options and school models was a good thing for the District.
Most said that they had unique programs and therefore were not competing; rather, the
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programs themselves were simply drawing in parents and students. The principals of
the DCPS schools expressed the most discomfort with competing with other DCPS
schools.
The majority of the charter-school principals had similar reservations about
competition. They spoke of providing educational alternatives as opposed to trying to
steal DCPS or other charter-school students. Essentially, they believed that they were
matching students to the right program, which had nothing to do with competing for
them. In short, they minimized the appearance of competition and certainly failed the
test of dynamic rivalry or contention envisioned by those who developed market
theory.
However, principals were comfortable discussing their need to recruit, the
consequences of under-enrollment, how they went about recruiting, and the materials
they used to represent and explain their schools.
The high school principals did respond with interest to the following questions:
Do they recruit? Are there consequences for a decrease in enrollment?
Are they aware of competition from other schools?
Are they open about their school s pros and cons? How do their materials and
web site reflect their perceived need to recruit?
The principals responses to these questions provide insight into the interplay
between the schools that make up the hybrid systems of schools enrolling public
students in the District. The principals proved to be less aware of the politically
charged world of school choice and market-based school reform theory than would be
expected from the volume of research and journal articles focused on their institutions.
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as well as the local political debate, editorial opinions, and advocacy groups supporting
and opposing the various choice policies. Rather, all the principals whether in
private, charter, or DCPS schools were intensely involved in managing their schools
and educating the students who walked through their doors every day. It should not be
surprising, given the extraordinary workload they shoulder, that few of the principals
reported having the willingness or time to engage in dynamic rivalry or contention
with other principals or systems.
Design of this Report
The results of this study of the conditions of competition among types of
publicly funded schools serving D.C. students are reported in the following chapters of
this paper.
Chapter 2 Literature review provides a fuller explanation of the use of the market
model by school-reform advocates and discusses the fit of education, a complex
public service, within market theory; the conditions required for effective competition;
the role of information and the consumer in efficient competition; and the role of the
principal in competing and providing information to potential consumers.
Chapter 3 Methodology explains the research framework and design, as well as the
research questions, data sources, and sampling procedures; data collection strategies;
interaction and contamination effects; and research analysis.
Chapter 4 Institutional Context and Constraints to Competition in D.C. explains
the design of the D.C. voucher program; the federal intervention in support of charter
schools and its impact on competition; and how DCPS mandate and centralized
management influences its capacity to compete.
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Chapter 5 D.C. High School Principals Experience with Competition explores
how and what D.C. high school principals think about competition and school choice.
Chapter 6 How D.C. Principals Recruit examines the impact that the enrollment
level of a specific school has on its principal s recruitment strategy and the
implementation of its recruitment efforts. It also examines how enrollment levels
influence the use of information materials to enable parents to make a reasoned choice
of schools.
Chapter 7 Conclusions and Implications for Policy, Practice, and Research
presents the conclusions of the study and discusses the policy concerns that are
suggested by the low level of competition reported by the principals and the structural
barriers that depress competition. Implications of these conclusions for both
policymakers and practitioners are discussed, as well as suggestions for further
research.
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE: THE CONNECTION BETWEEN
COMPETITION AND SCHOOL REFORM
Introduction and Definitions
Americans generally assume that there is a connection between competition and
the efficiencies achieved by the free enterprise system. However, there is not the same
tacit agreement that competition between schools will result in higher-performing
students or a better education system. For that matter, theorists debate the legitimacy of
applying market theory to a public service such as education. Some consider it a leap
of faith to believe that competition will somehow magically produce high-functioning,
self-correcting schools. The other side of the debate points to the dilemma of struggling
urban school systems and insists that the leap into market-based reform is just what is
needed to both improve these schools and manage costs. At some point, though,
educators have to move past theoretical debate and consider what competition between
and among schools means in practice. Something or someone has to engage in
competition, be it one system competing with another, one school attempting to recruit
students away from the school down the road, or one principal challenging another
principal as they both strive to build more attractive and effective programs. After four
decades of this debate and considerably more experience with charter schools, voucher-
receiving schools, and publicly directed schools all serving the same population, there
should be a clearer picture of how competition influences the performance of schools.
To explore the connection between competition and school reform, this
literature review considers what economists and other theorists posit is the juncture
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between competition and school reform and the distinction between increased school
choice and market-based school reform. It begins with a discussion of the terms
school choice, market-based school reform, and competition, and a brief history
of the politics driving the move toward private management of public education and
why it matters in the debate over reform of urban schools. It then examines the
elements of the market model and the importance of competition, consumers, and
information in the adequate workings of the model. Particular attention is given to
examining why some educators consider invoking the metaphor of the competitive
market to be disingenuous, misleading, and simplistic when tackling the complex issue
of urban education reform. The role of school leaders in the provision of information is
also examined. Finally, the review will discuss the gaps in knowledge about how
school leaders actually engage other schools in competition and how they use
information to recruit families to their schools.
Definitions: Choice, Market-Based School Reform, and Competition
Today, people use the term school choice when discussing the set of hybrid
school structures operating in U.S. cities. The term once was more concise: Instead of
embracing methods of privatization, such as vouchers and tax credits, it described only
programs initiated in the 1970s and 1980s to diversify public education and bring new
educational options into the public schools (Pipho, 1998, p. 269). Today, privatization
in the form of vouchers, tax credits and private management of public schools is also
considered school choice and benefits from its association with the more popular choice
concept.
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How this fusion or confusion of terms came to pass is part evolution, part
political strategy and part the imprecision of education writers. Some say the intention
is to confuse, or avoid the negative connotation of privatization and piggyback on the
less controversial concept of choice. Henig quotes Mary Metz as saying. The variety
of plans for organizing schools that can be subsumed under the title of choice is so large
and so diverse in its educational, social, and political consequences that to speak of
them all together under the single category of schooling based on choice is to confuse
far more than to communicate ( 1 994, p. 1 74).
The concepts, however, continue to be distinct in purpose: The term school
choice describes efforts to increase the number of educational options available to a
public school student through publicly directed and funded schools. Market-based
school reform is a market concept, not an outcome. It is a way of managing schools,
not for ensuring choice. In its purest form, universal vouchers, government would pay
for schooling, but private entities would manage the schools. This privatization would
shed[s] governmental responsibilities in favor of market forces, (Henig, 1994. p.xiii).
Growth of school choice
Americans have developed considerable choice, or curricular and schooling
options, within their public schools and they have done so through planning and a
perception of a need for education alternatives. Researchers estimate that over half of
American families exercise some type of choice, the most notable being where they
choose to live. Roughly 10% of students attend schools other than their neighborhood
school through intra-district transfers to specialty, alternative, magnet or special
emphasis schools within publicly directed traditional schools (Sugarman & Henig,
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1999, pp. 13-75). Other choice programs, such as directed choice in which parents
must actively select a school even if they choose their neighborhood school, provide
increased choice within a public school system. The table below illustrates the large
number of families that already participate in choice.
Table 1. Nature and extent of school choice programs in the United States
(Sugarman, Stephen & Henig, Jeffrey
,
1999, p. 29)
Programs Number Percent
Total elementary and secondary schoolchildren 50.0 million 100
Schoolchildren privately educated 6.0 million 12
Tuition-paid private school 5.0 million 12
Home schooling 1.0 million 2
Using publicly funded vouchers for private school *
Using privately funded vouchers for private school *
Schoolchildren in public school choice programs 23.5 million 47
Intradistrict choice programs (specialty, alternative, and magnet
school choice districts, individual transfers, false addresses
5 0 million 10
Interdistrict choice 0.3 million 0.6
Charter schools 0.2 0.4
Choice through choice of residence 18.0 million 36
Total schoolchildren in choice schools 29.5 million 59
* Less than 0.1
Magnet, specialized and alternative schools, and schools within schools increase
curricular offerings. For example, they can provide more art-based programs or more
intensive math and science courses than those offered in a neighborhood public school.
In addition to state-administered choice options, nearly 3,000 new charter schools have
been launched since states began passing charter school legislation in the 1990
(Uscharterschools.org, 2005). Although these schools can, and often do, offer the same
curriculum as the traditional public schools, many report that their purpose is to serve
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special populations such as low income, underachieving and/or at-risk youth and
language minorities or that they have an intensive program in a specific academic area.
How important is competition to school choice?
The growth of schooling choices, in most cases, has been evolutionary, with
public schools responding to parental interests and providing choice as a result of
planning to achieve social or educational goals. Competition played little or no role in
generating this particular school reform; rather, desire to achieve greater racial
integration was the impetuous for the establishment of many magnet schools (Henig,
1996). Other schools of choice within publicly directed systems filled needs that could
not be met at all neighborhood schools, but could be accommodated at a centralized
specialized school. Public schools for the performing arts or schools with an emphasis
on mathematics and science are examples. However, public school systems do report
competition among parents to enroll their children in the better magnet and
specialized schools.
Political Strategies, Not Competition, Promote Market-Based School Reform
Proponents of market-based school reform have over the last 20 years met
considerable resistance and their progress has necessarily been a result of strategy and
political power. Their persistence paid off in 2000, which marked the return of a
conservative administration to the White House and, with it, an invigorated push for
school vouchers and other forms of market-based school reform. The George W. Bush
administration ushered in the No Child Left Behind Act with a stunningly muscular
federal role in education accountability and, through it, mandatory increased
competition. Under the act, if a public school fails to perform academically, its district
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must offer transfers to well-performing schools and, following subsequent years of
failure, the school is required to reorganize, become a charter or hire private
management. For the first time, federal law required that increased choice shall be the
consequence of failure and private management shall be a possibility.
In fact, the Bush administration was reviving major education themes from the
administrations of George H.W. Bush (1989-1993) and Ronald Reagan (1981-1989).
Public education was to be structured to mimic market systems and private competition
injected into the monopoly of government-run public schools. Private-school
vouchers were promoted as a means of separating the funding of public education from
the actual provision of instruction.
Many of the President s key staff had served all three administrations and, not
surprisingly, the conservative movement s drive toward privatization and/or greater
private/public competition continued, 1 with each administration furthering these
objectives through strategies tailored to the politics of the time. President Bush spoke
of school choice instead of vouchers and tax credits, but at the same time he brought on
a Secretary of Education who supported vouchers and public funding of religious
schools.
-
This Bush administration intended to make big changes and knew that it could.
During the eight years of the Clinton administration, which favored increased choice
through magnet schools and publicly regulated charter schools, conservative
foundations had continued to funnel funds to local pro-market reformist organizations
that in turn had increased the demand (or tolerance) for school privatization in their
states. Their efforts bore fruit in the state-enacted voucher programs in Cleveland,
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Milwaukee, and the state of Florida. President Bush and Congress would build on their
efforts by enacting a federal voucher experiment for the District of Columbia in 2004
(Cavanaugh, 2004).
After two decades of strategies and four Republican terms at the bully pulpit
of national education policy, however, only a small percentage of public students
receive vouchers.
3
There was enormous pushback from teacher unions, established
education institutions, and analysts concerned about the direction of the change one
termed it a shift from the common school to parental choice and institutional
competition (Boyd, 1991, p. 23). The debate is fought on the web sites of conservative
and liberal organizations that receive heavy funding from foundations that are deeply
invested in the issues.
Since the 1970s, voucher proponents have exercised strong message control and
replaced controversial words, such as privatization, with less politically loaded words,
such as scholarships, making vouchers less visible. Henig chronicles a major strategy
shift by the Reagan White House in early 1988 to allow a political reclamation of a
foundering idea (Henig, 1994, p.78). He notes that President Reagan retreated from
his pledge to abolish the Department of Education and adopted a choice within public
school stance: [I]n place of an emphasis on tuition tax credits, vouchers, and private
schools, Reagan was touting the notion that choice among public schools would suffice
to stimulate educational reform (Henig, 1994, p. 79).
The term school choice continues to provide camouflage for proposals to
privatize public education, mostly because the term has been redefined. For example,
for most Americans the word choice connotes an abundance of options and a freedom
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to consider buying the best. When choice is combined with school, there is an
implication that parents will have an abundance of schools to choose from and possibly
more choices than in the past. The implication is that parents will be able to consider
which school would be best and have a reasonable expectation of obtaining that
education for their children.
Is increased choice a product of market-based school reform?
An unanswered question is whether school choice that embraces modes of
privatization will increase or decrease choice and give parents more or less access to
scarce education programs. (In theory, a system can privatize the management of
schools without increasing schooling options.) A related question is whether increased
choice is an intended outcome of privatization, or whether efficiency and least cost are
the preeminent considerations. Friedman proposed universal vouchers primarily to
reduce the indiscriminate extension of governmental responsibility for public
education (Friedman, 1962. p. 85). Fie intended to reduce centralized government
control and, in the process, centralized planning. Whatever the benefits of reduced
government involvement, there would be no vehicle to ensure adequate spaces in the
desired programs. For example, if 140 children enrolled for the first year of a
Montessori program, would there be 14 classrooms ready to receive them? Would a
high-performing science magnet school be forced to close if it operated at higher than
the approved per pupil cost? The conservative economists would respond that market
demands would eventually make available the right number of Montessori classrooms
and that the magnet school should close and eventually be replaced by a more efficient
science magnet school. A precipitous implementation of a universal vouchers system
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predictably would result in the closing of the more costly alternative programs that are
currently supported in the planned environment of a school district. The actual types of
schools would decrease, diminishing school choice (at least in the short term.).
Who means what by school choice? At this point, most education writers
have acceded to the collective redefinition of vouchers and tax credits/deductions as
school choice, even though the proponents of these modes for privatizing public
education do not necessarily intend to increase school choice. Rather, they propose
including only private and parochial schools among the choices offered to parents
through public funding. Of course, the parochial schools would bring families the
innovation of religious instruction, but both the private and parochial schools could be
providing nothing new to the academic programs available to a system s students.
This distinction seems tedious, too inside baseball to matter for most people
and underscores the difficulty writers have in describing the evolution of the concepts.
For example. Henig dedicates a chapter to Repackaging Choice (1993, pp. 78-96)
tracing the deliberate strategies of the Reagan and the first Bush administrations to
redefine the meaning of school choice so that vouchers and tax credits would share the
American public s good will toward school choice within public schools. Yet in his
preface he summarizes: Under Presidents Reagan and Bush, school choice was raised
higher on the policy agenda and its meaning came to be more deeply imbued with the
premises of economic theories about how markets perform (1993, p.xiii). Possibly
unintended, Henig s switch to the passive voice, offering no indication of who imbued
school choice with economic theories, implies a natural, non-engineered evolution of
the merger between privatization and school choice.
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Political actors planned and executed the strategic rehabilitation of the concept
of vouchers and other forms of privatization because of their belief in a limited role for
government in education. Carrying out the strategy was not illegal, wrongful, or
subversive; rather, it was the overt, well-coordinated political action of conservative
activists who made little secret of their beliefs regarding the role of government, equity,
and the redistribution of wealth and power. 4
Market-Based School Reform
Economists make it clear that when they speak of market-based school reform
their purpose is twofold; to introduce market elements, such as competition, into
public school management and to apply a system to education with the goal of
spending the least amount of money for a specified outcome that is determined
politically. Walberg and Bast explain this point, stating. Most educators confuse the
methodology of economics with ideology or bias. In fact, it is a value-neutral
language for describing how an important part of the world works that yields testable
propositions with predictive power (2001, p. 3). The authors provide the following
examples of propositions with predictive power that can and have been tested, which
also illustrate the financial focus of market-based school reform:
In school systems where there are no consequences for either success or failure,
higher spending will not produce better results.
As the source of a school s funding shifts further away from those who benefit
from the school, the school s cost-effectiveness will fall.
Competing special interest groups will capture the surplus rent generated by
the government schools monopoly on tax funding.
Because they can be held accountable to their customers, private schools (all
other things held constant) should produce larger gains in student achievement
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per dollar spent as well as report superior results by other measures than their
government school counterparts.
Opposition to cost cutting and reforms that would provide greater accountability
to customers will come primarily from the interest groups benefiting from the
government school monopoly.
Because they are more likely to be held accountable to parents, private schools
are more likely to adopt policies popular with parents than are government
schools.
Programs that require schools to compete for tuition dollars should show
improvements in student achievement and in measures of effective organization.
(Walberg& Bast, 2001, pp. 14-17).
The ideal of market-based school reform is the total conversion of the public
school system to a private system, funded and possibly monitored by government, but
managed by independent bodies competing in an education market. (Education writers
frequently credit Milton Friedman with first proposing the idea of vouchers in the
United States (Moe, 2001, p. 2). Friedman proposed a universal voucher system in
which the State could require a minimum level of schooling financed by giving parents
vouchers redeemable for a specified maximum sum per child per year if spent on
approved educational services (Friedman, 1962, p. 89). All students were to attend
private schools with tuition paid by the state, eliminating the state-managed schools that
have dominated American public education for decades.
Clearly, as envisioned by Friedman, market-based education would not be
evolutionary; rather, it would be a complete system built around markets that require
intact elements such as buyers and sellers competing to determine the price of a
product. Only a total conversion to a universal voucher system would permit the
operation of the perfectly competitive system he envisioned.
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Competition
A discussion of competition must necessarily leave the theoretical realm once
economists stop talking about market competition, and begin to focus on the actual
interaction between and among competitors. There is an assumption that competitors
know each other and will engage in the rough and tumble of competition. Baskoy
states that Veblen, . . . Adam Smith, David Ricardo, Karl Marx, and Austrian
economists, described market competition as a dynamic process of rivalry and
contention, not a market structure (Veblen [1904], 1932, 218) (Baskoy, 2003, p. 1 126).
Dewey states that almost every definition of competition has connotations of
rivalry .... Sellers of a product are presumed by unilateral action to seek to advance
their own interests at the expense of sellers of the same or similar products. The forms
of business rivalry defy enumeration, but the most common are, as we know, price
cutting, advertising, and product improvement. . . . We note that the concept of rivalry
also implies the existence of economically interesting alternatives (Dewey, 1969, p. 2).
Dewey further states that there is an assumption that:
. . . every seller prefers a higher price to a lower price and every buyer
prefers a lower price to a higher price. In the case of a socialist economy
that seeks to use competition as an organizing principle, predictability is
secured by directing the state-owned firms to behave as if they were
income maximizers. It is hardly necessary to observe that, in both
private enterprise and socialist economic systems, income-maximizing
behavior by firms is subject to a large number of constraints (1969, p. 4).
The market-based school reform depends on a great number of income-
maximizing school administrators prepared to take on other schools with rivalry and
contention. Or there is the other option of instructing school administrators to behave
in a competitive manner. This is a recognized option: instituting a competition
authority has been a solution for countries transitioning from state-run to open
economies:
Countries that are counting on the beneficial effects of market reforms
must take bold steps to ensure that anticompetitive rules, regulations,
and licensing procedures that protect existing businesses to the
detriment of would-be entrants and at great expense to consumers do
not fetter the competitive process. Only the rough and tumble struggle
that is the competitive process can create efficient, innovative firms
capable of holding their own in domestic and international markets.
The creation of a competent, competition authority at the highest level
of government with the clear mandate to battle rent-seeking and its
anticompetitive consequences is a necessary first step toward realizing
the full benefits of market reforms (Singleton, 1997, p. 10).
The Elements of the Market Model
Competition is clearly the major ingredient in the functioning of the market
model, but as can be seen from the authors above, it is a complex concept, as are the
other elements of the market model. This complexity is one of the reasons proponents
of the market-based school reform model make use of the market metaphor. Theorists
frequently find reference to a metaphor to describe not what presently exists, but a
vision of future reality. Proponents of market-based school reform use the market
metaphor to advocate for a future privatized system of public education.
Critical Elements of the Market Metaphor
The current hybrid set of schooling offerings found in U.S. cities appears to
mimic a market-driven system; hence, numerous writers and advocates speak of the
market metaphor or market model when discussing school choice (Henig, 1994;
Smith & Meier, 1995; Whitty et. al., 1998). Analysts concur that until a full-scale
competitive system is tried in a serious fashion, on a large scale, over a lengthy period
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(Education Next, 2001
,
p. 2), the effects of competition as school reform cannot be
known. Until such a wide scale experiment takes place, most advocates and observers
will use metaphor and the lessons from smaller projects to explain market-based school
reform.
In the classic sense, competition and monopoly refer only to the number of
buyers and sellers: The adjective perfect placed before competition and monopoly
indicates that the market is unalloyed in all respects. Since perfect monopoly is
defined as a market where there is only one seller who has complete control over the
price, in perfect competition there must be more than one seller, and each seller must
have no influence on the price (Thin, 1960. p. 7). Further, if we are searching for the
perfect, all units of the product sold by different sellers must be identical . .
.
[to] a
large number of buyers and sellers so that the amount sold by any one seller or by
several in combination is negligible (Thin, 1960, p. 11). And ... in equilibrium each
seller equates his marginal cost to the market price to decide the best output (p. 1 5).
Additionally, in perfect competition, two conditions are always satisfied: An
individual seller cannot influence the price of others and an individual seller cannot fix
his own price above the market price (p. 19). Finally, perfect information describes
a state of complete knowledge that is available to all market participants and that is
instantaneously updated as new information arises (fact.org, 2001, ^ 1).
The functioning of schooling options in the United States compares poorly with
the pure model described above. Although there are now multiple providers (i.e.,
charter schools, magnet schools, private schools) where only one supplier formerly
operated, other pieces are missing, most notably a profit motive. Pearson points out
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that, profit is the motivation of the market. It is the rhetoric that obscures the motive
and confuses us. Are we being similarly confused with the market rhetoric applied to
education? (Pearson, 1993, p. 75). Pearson also notes that federal administrations
both conservative and liberal periodically have ignored supply-side dogma and bailed
out unprofitable businesses, such as Chrysler and the Lockheed corporations and
Continental Illinois Bank in 1984 (1993, pp. 72-75). He concludes that, in the same
way, poorly run schools do not and will not automatically go out of business. Pearson
argues that profit and failure are the motivators in the market model, but fails to find the
motivators in market-based education reform.
If poorly performing schools fail to close, district administrators have failed to
maximize public resources and to face squarely their economic or opportunity cost, the
cost associated with the opportunities that are foregone by not putting the firm s [the
city s] resources to their highest-value use (Pindyck & Rubinfeld, 2001, p. 204). For
example, by transferring students and their per student funds to a low-performing
charter school, the cost is greater than the accounted cost. The true cost of any
schooling decision is that which must be foregone as a consequence (Adnett & Davies,
2002. p. 3).
Equally concerning is the weakness of the parents-as-consumers metaphor. As
voucher proponent Terry M. Moe observes, there is no groundswell from parents to
adopt the market-based school reform model: The key players on both sides are
individuals and groups, many of them quite powerful, who are actively involved in
politics on a continuing basis, knowledgeable about the relevant arguments and the
facts, and intent on using their influence to shape public policy (Moe, 2001, p. 5). At
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the same time, Moe reports, fully 65 percent of Americans say they have not heard
about vouchers (200 1
,
p. 1 73). If vouchers, the core vehicle of privatization, are so
poorly recognized, it is hard to believe that many parents are the eager consumers
needed to make the competitive market-based school reform model work.
Henig states, the market overlay provides a sheen of intellectual rigor, the
reflected stature of economic theory ( 1 994, p. 1 88), and is used to provide a
comfortable explanation to parents that privatization will be like shopping for schools
and to bridge the gap between evidence and prescription. Lacking any working
examples of a truly market-based system of school choice, proponents have based their
claim to empirical support on the implied analogy between certain existing practices
and free-market models. ... It is this analogy that sustains the interpretive leap: [I]f it
can be demonstrated that these practices succeed in promoting educational achievement
without undermining equality, then stronger steps to displace governmental with market
forces are surely worth trying (1994, p. 13).
The much discussed 1990 book. Politics
,
Markets and America's Schools, by
John E. Chubb and Terry M. Moe, used the market metaphor to charge scholars to
reconsider privatization and direct parental choice. They cite massive dissatisfaction
with the public schools and proclaim the culprit to be the monopoly of the traditional
public schools, the institutions of direct democratic control (1990, p. 2) that burden
the schools with excessive bureaucracy, . . . inhibit effective organization, and . . . stifle
student achievement (p. ix). They recommend a wholly different system one built
around school autonomy and parent/student choice rather than direct democratic
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control (p. 25) and provide a detailed scholarship plan that could be described as a
universal voucher plan (p. 26).
Smith and Meier in The Case Against School Choice: Politics, Markets and
Fools, (1995) challenge the fit of Chubb and Moe s metaphor to the operation of
schools, urging them to convert their a priori assumptions to empirical, and, thus,
provable questions (p. 34). Specifically, the assumptions are:
• There is a large pool of unsatisfied demand for an educational product
superior to that offered in public schools (p. 34).
• There is adequate uniformity in public schools and in private schools to
provide a basis for comparison of institutional environments (p. 36).
• The preferable way to regulate education is through the market and by
eliminating democratic control and decentralizing authority to the individual
school. Instead of responding to political institutions, schools will respond
to the consumers of their services. Instead of democratic bodies deciding
budgets and values, let dollars follow students and allow schools to compete
for their patronage (p. 37).
• The primary function of public schools should be to meet the needs of the
individual student.
• Democratic control causes poor educational performance and that
competition can improve it while existing institutions cannot (p. 39).
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Quasi-Market Model: The Better Metaphor
Several writers argue that the quasi-market model is a more apt concept than
the market metaphor to describe the functioning of the hybrid set of schooling
options. Quasi-market institutions bring market-like forces to bear on the
production of goods and services, . . . directly by separating provision and
production so that the latter is generated via a market (e.g., vouchers and
contracting) (Lowery, 1998). Lowery stresses that the quasi-market will fail if
consumer sovereignty is not the foremost consideration. He states that possible
reasons for loss of consumer sovereignty are:
• Institutions are not able to satisfy heterogeneous wants with productive
efficiency, i.e., high-quality services at a low price. Homogenous services
can be provided efficiently or heterogeneous services provided inefficiently
(Lowery, 1998).
• Consumers lack sufficient information to make choices that reflect their true
preferences. Lowery quotes Tibor Scitovsky (1962, p. 265) that there will be
no great loss of sovereignty as long as [the consumer] ... is able to distinguish
the good from the bad and to recognize solid construction, good design, and
practical and imaginative ideas. However, Lowery notes that the goods and
services of an education quasi-market are often much more complex than
those typical of private market transactions and that in Ferris and Graddy s
terms, "The more complex the product, the better suited it is to public
production.
Lowery states that the quasi-market institution faces three challenges: 1) poor
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information; 2) manipulation of information (misleading representation); and 3)
preference substitution, e.g., the institution intends to offer quality education but the
parent makes the choice based on the quality of the football team.
Simply put, . . . the separation of provision and production creates two sets of
consumers those who make the collective decision to provide a public good or service
and those who consume what is functionally a private good within the quasi-market (p.
333). (There are two consumers: the state that is offering the education and the
individual who will purchase the service. The state determines the academic standard
and the parent decides whether or not to send their child to that school.).
Lowery concludes that consumer sovereignty can be compromised if there are
too few competitors, if preferences are ill-informed or are biased by manipulation or by
externalities, or if the preferences of production consumers are different from and
substituted for those of provision consumers. When any of these conditions obtain,
quasi-markets will work only in the narrow sense of ensuring that at least some
exchanges are transacted (p. 333).
What It Takes to Make a Market Work
Gaebler and Osborne, in their highly influential book Reinventing Government ,
present arguments for introducing competition and other market forces into the service
delivery currently managed by government. Their premise is that in many situations
government should lead rather than be the provider of services and that by more
effectively using existing markets it can leverage its resources for a better product.
However, they gave the following examples of instances when markets fail: When a
small number of firms dominate a market, true competition often disappears. When
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customers do not have adequate information, they are often victimized. Profiteers have
preyed upon the poor and uneducated throughout our history from the days when
snake oil salesmen sold bogus medicines to more recent scandals in which shady
mortgage companies have taken advantage of poor homeowners ( 1 992, p. 29 1 ).
Gaebler and Osborne summarized 6 elements that they believe are critical when
a government is considering a market mechanism to solve a problem. If these 6
elements do not exist, then the government should consider restructuring the market to
provide the missing elements. If not, it may be better to stay with an administrative
mechanism (p. 291).
Supply. . . . There should be enough suppliers to ensure competition.
Demand. Customers must have enough purchasing power to buy the
product or service, and they must have a desire to exercise that
purchasing power. . . .
Accessibility. Sellers must be easily accessible to buyers. Often this
requires brokers to carry out transactions. For example, buyers of stock
do not meet sellers of stock; instead they use stockbrokers to make
transactions. . . .
Information. When consumers do not have adequate information about
the price, quality, and risks of a product or service, their decisions will
be flawed. They will end up paying too much for an inferior product
Rules. These are normally established through government.
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Policing. As in any activity, those who would prey on the uninformed
need to know they may be caught and punished (Osborne & Gaebler,
1992, pp. 291-2).
Gaebler s and Osborne s 6 elements summarize much of the thinking around the
decision to marketize public education discussed in earlier sections. At this point in the
United States, many of the elements are missing, particularly adequate information.
Effective policing, with consequences for poorly performing or mismanaged schools,
also is weak. The reforming power of competition predictably could be compromised if
the information (i.e., adequate information to make a reasoned choice) and policing
(i.e., poorly performing schools going out of business) are not in place.
The Critical Element of Information
Lowery states, . . . markets, nonmarkets, and quasi-markets can fail if
consumers lack sufficient information to make choices that reflect their true
preferences (Lowery, 1998). Similarly, Pindyck and Rubinfeld warn that:
If consumers do not have accurate information about market prices or product
quality, the market system will not operate efficiently. This lack of information
may give producers an incentive to supply too much of some products and too
little of others. In other cases, while some consumers may not buy a product
even though they would benefit from doing so, others buy a product that leaves
them worse off. For example, consumers may buy pills that guarantee weight
loss, only to find that they have no medical value. Finally, a lack of information
may prevent some markets from ever developing. It may, for examples, be
impossible to purchase certain kinds of insurance because suppliers of insurance
lack adequate information about consumers likely to at risk.
Each of these informational problems can lead to competitive market
inefficiency (2001, p. 592).
The irony is that, with the large debate over harnessing market behavior to drive
school reform raging in the background, so little attention has been paid to the question
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of how to inform the consumer the critical player in all market models. The question
is how to provide accurate, adequate, non-manipulated information so that enough
parents are informed and prepared to choose (or work to reform) a school that reflects
their preference. How do parents sort through the is so, is not debate that school
choice has become?
No presumption of good will
Our current mixture of schooling options came about as a result of intense
political pressure, accompanied by manipulation of information (issue advertising) and,
on occasion, through the intervention of legislatures or the courts (i.e., in Milwaukee,
Colorado, and the District of Columbia). Few of the players would argue that the
current diversity of school structures is the best resolution. Many advocates of market-
based schools want universal privatization, not a mishmash of nonmarkets, quasi-
markets, etc. Nor will advocates urge their chosen schools to voluntarily provide the
public with comparable data about their students performance.
The voucher-receiving private schools insist on independence of operation and
resist the use of comparable performance tests. In Washington, D.C., federal law
blocks effective comparison of school performance by exempting the private schools
participating in the D.C. voucher program from NCLB reporting requirements and the
state testing program established by the of District of Columbia. The Milwaukee
Parental Choice Program is a case study of failure of privatization proponents and
opponents to agree on comparability measures (Witte, 1999, p. 59). The Cleveland
Scholarship and Tutoring Program (voucher program) became a battleground between
independent evaluators and a prestigious researcher contracted by two voucher-
receiving private schools (Zajano, 1998). In short, there has been little collegiality or
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natural urge to compete on a level field, either among education providers or among
advocates, researchers, and commentators.
Charter schools also object to the use of state-imposed standardized tests, but
are governed by the No Child Left Behind Act which requires them to report their
results on state mandated tests. Traditional schools also are required to report their test
performance.
While charter schools, voucher-receiving schools, and traditional schools appear
to make up a complementary set of options, examination of their web sites calls in
question whether they can ever be willing collaborators in an evenhanded information
strategy. Many conservative organizations maintain websites that promote universal
privatization or other forms of market-based education. Their goal is to replace, not
coexist with, traditional schools/
Web sites promoting charter schools are numerous, but while less polemical
than the voucher sites and focused on providing technical assistance to existing and
would-be charter schools, they speak of a charter school movement and disparage the
traditional schools .
0
Several organizations supporting the traditional public schools
maintain web sites that actively oppose privatization. While they frequently support
charter schools, they express concern about the charter school drain of funds and
leadership from the traditional schools . 7
Money from both the left and the right stokes the school-choice wars and
ensures that concessions are unlikely. However, conservative foundations are more
likely to support policy advocacy than mainstream and progressive organizations.
These liberal foundations prefer to focus on direct services to disenfranchised
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populations and communities (Krehely, House & Kernan, 2004, p. 22) rather than
fighting directly for the maintenance of the traditional schools. The conservative
organizations also support local think tanks that have been successful in influencing
state and city legislation in support of charter schools and vouchers. 8 With this
financial support, privatization proponents have every reason to continue to fight
centralized accountability efforts and have few incentives to provide data on their
performance.
Two Concerns About Information Available in the Quasi-Market
Both advocates and opponents of vouchers set forth arguments that, while
tremendously passionate, are based largely on ideology, with minimal or only selective
reliance on factual evidence. The result has been an antagonistic, vocal, highly visible
confrontation between believers and nonbelievers (Metcalf& Tait, 1999, p. 65).
Metcalf and Tait express the concern of many educators (Whitty, 1998, p. 4;
Moe, 2001, pp. 10-1 1) who note that experts on both sides (most see only two sides)
often argue from unreliable data that would is, on any account, inadequate to guide the
dismantlement of a centralized public school system in favor of a market-based
structure.
These concerns that massive reforms are being promoted without adequate
research pale in significance to the charges that professional researchers have
deliberately invented an education crisis through misinformation, manipulation of data
and lies to further an ideological end. Berliner and Biddle make this accusation
unequivocally in their book The Manufactured Crisis: Myths , Fraud, and the Attack on
America's Public Schools :
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The Manufactured Crisis was not an accidental event. Rather, it appeared
within a specific historical context and was led by identifiable critics whose
political goals could be furthered by scapegoating educators. It was also
supported from its inception by an assortment of questionable techniques
including misleading methods for analyzing data, distorting reports of findings,
and suppressing contradictory evidence. Moreover, it was tied to misguided
schemes for reforming education schemes that would, if adopted, seriously
damage American schools (Berliner & Biddle, 1996, p. 4).
Smith and Meier concur with Berliner and Biddle, though less ferociously, that a
crisis has been declared in order to soften the public for radical structural change in
education. They state that not only is there no crisis, despite massive numbers of news
stories to the contrary, but also, . . . evidence suggests that even the most beleaguered
schools are helping students. The Council of the Great City Schools (1992, p. xiv),
representing the nation s forty largest urban school districts, reports, there is good
evidence to show that urban schools are doing unusually well in the areas of childhood
programming, advanced course placements, graduates pursuit of four year colleges and
universities, and in-school drug and alcohol abuse
Henig, in his chapter titled The Political Meaning of Crisis, concludes that a
broad and evenhanded review of the relevant evidence suggests that the crisis label is
problematic, and supports those who are seeking nonincremental change (1992, p.
50).
The Assumption that Parents Want to be Education Consumers
Researchers on consumer behavior conclude that most adults are not
natural information seekers (London & Della Bitta, 1984, p.421) and that most
consumers make their choices based on little information even if they are buying
costly items or making major decisions that will have significant impact on their
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lives. Furthermore, scholars know little about how parents make decisions and
who influences them when they do. The mere posting of data, be it on a website
or in brochures, does not ensure that consumers will be able or willing to use it
to inform their choices.
The picture apparently is no different when parents are choosing schools.
Ascher, et al., state that few parents of any social class appear willing to
acquire the information necessary to make active and informed educational
choices ( 1 996, pp. 40-4 1 ). Public Agenda writers note. It isn t that people are
undecided as much as that they are unaware. The vast majority of the public
knows very little about school vouchers, charter schools or for-profit schools
(Public Agenda, 1999).
Although the ideal would be that all parents actively participate in
information gathering, researchers suggest that consumers often use shortcuts
and marginal consumers as guides to shopping. Shopping parents also
perform the function of articulating their preferences, which, in market theory,
should cause suppliers to rush to fulfill those preferences. The larger the
number of engaged shoppers, the greater their capacity to mold the market to
their preference.
Buckley and Schneider call attention to this question of how many
consumers are required to become information seekers to ensure a successful
information strategy. They cite Schwartz and Wilde (1979, p. 638) who argue:
The conventional analysis asks the wrong question. Rather than asking
whether an idealized individual is sufficiently informed to maximize
his own utility, the appropriate nonnative inquiry is whether
competition among firms [here, read schools] for particular groups of
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searchers is, in any given market, sufficient to generate optimal prices
and terms for all consumers. Thus, competitive markets require at least
some consumers to be sufficiently informed so as to pressure producers
to deliver services efficiently ( 2003).
Buckley and Schneider s thorough article. Shopping for Schools: How
do marginal consumers gather information about schools?, presents research
on cognitive shortcuts and the importance of a small cadre of market
makers (2003). Their report suggests that individuals find the search for
information costly balancing decision accuracy (the benefit) against
cognitive effort (the cost); taking cues from more informed individuals is
economically rational; by forming simple and effective strategies about the
information to use and how to use it, people make the same decisions they
otherwise would if they were expert ( Lupia & McCubbins, 1998, p. 63); a
subset of consumers, termed marginal consumers, perform research prior to
purchasing and this subset is as small as 10%-20% of consumers; and.
marginal consumers influence uninformed ones through communication and
example (pp. 35-36).
The Role of the Principal in Using Information and in Competition
Maranto, et ah, in their book School Choice in the Real World: Lessons from
Arizona Charter Schools, purport that Arizona has the first system approaching
comprehensive school choice in the real world [in the United States] (1999, p. 2).
Among their many findings, the authors report: because charters will not replace
district schools, they may have their greatest effects via impacts on district schools that
are trying to compete (p. 24 1 ).
Trying to compete appears to be a pivotal concept. Researchers of the Irish
(Mckeown & Byrne, 2000, p. 145) and New Zealand (Fiske & Ladd, 2000) schools
experience with competition within a quasi-market found that merely developing an
environment for competition did not ensure that schools would compete. Rather, the
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initiatives of the head administrator were critical. Fiske and Ladd do report on a
competition that took on a highly personal character between 2 principals (2000. pp.
211-212) while other schools in the area failed to compete at all. Amott and Raab
found that only 50% of the Irish schools in their study chose to ... organize
opportunities for the parents of potential pupils to become involved with the school
(2000, p. 150). The other 50% provided little information other than the tables of
performance test scores and failed to promote their schools in any other way.
Proponents of market-based education stress the importance of competition in
achieving the efficiencies of the market, and yet the literature is not reporting a clear
pattern of effective competition. The examples above could suggest that there is a
particular personality type that is able or willing to enter into the competition. Possibly
school leaders have to be more aware of the negative consequences for failing in the
competition or more personally take on the challenge of competition.
A 1996 article in Education Week, titled Market-Based Education: The New
Game Has Begun, predicted that new behaviors would be needed by school leaders if
they were to last another decade. The author warned:
School leaders must learn new skills and strategies quickly enough to
avoid a serious erosion of their market share. Most schools do not have
the financial reserves necessary to weather the kind of long-term storm
experienced by the auto industry. They must, therefore, respond much
more quickly. This means getting help. Outside resources can assist
them in developing needed market analysis, quality improvement, and
advertising skills very quickly. The auto industry floundered in attempts
to improve quality using old ideas. Its leaders did not turn to outside
sources of new thinking (Padden, 16).
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According to Padden, market-based school reform requires school leaders to be
entrepreneurial as well as academic leaders.
Gaps in Knowledge
Competition is the key element of the market-based school reform model. As
seen above, economists predict certain market efficiencies, based on a fully operational
model in which competition between buyers and sellers influences the price of the
product or service. Perfect information pertinent information available to all is
critical to effective competition. Families behaving as consumers are critical elements
in the model. Yet it is clear that there is no example of a U.S. city or school district in
which this universal, openly competitive education market is functioning.
The U.S. market-based school reform argument, rather, is focused on cities with
multiple schooling options publicly directed traditional schools being challenged by
charter schools and scholarship/voucher programs. Rather than buyers and sellers
molding this market, externalities such as state and federal governments are directing
and influencing the products and services. Information is far from perfect in that the
buyer and sellers are not demanding, nor are they being provided with, comparable
information on the products schools, their programs, and their performance. The
picture in most U.S. cities with growing numbers of charter schools and voucher
programs is of a jumble of schooling options that are presumed to be competing.
There is danger in that presumption, as will be seen in Chapter 4, in that the
schooling options frequently are not competing on a level field. Schools will fail not
because they are not a part of the puzzle that has become urban education, but rather
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because they are serving low-income, frequently poorly prepared students in frequently
unattractive neighborhoods, these schools have little advantage in recruitment.
Fiske and Ladd detail New Zealand s nationwide effort to capture the
efficiencies of the market through decentralized management, parental choice, and
competition between schools and charter schools (2000, pp. 4-5). Their conclusions are
cautionary: First, the system clearly works better for some types of students than
others. . . . Second, full parental choice is not sustainable over time, especially in fast
growing areas ... a system of parental choice can quite quickly become a system in
which schools do much of the choosing. . . . Third, despite the strong incentives
imposed by competition for schools at the bottom to improve, the New Zealand
experience documents that it is very difficult for them to do so on their own (2000, pp.
250-51). New Zealand s experiment is ongoing, with many more initiatives taken in
the interim to correct the expensive side effects of under-enrolled and over-subscribed
schools and buildings located in the wrong areas.
The parallels with public school reform in the U.S. are considerable. As Fiske
and Ladd conclude. The story of [New Zealand s] Tomorrow s Schools reforms
suggests that many of the concepts now being exchanged in the global marketplace of
ideas about school reform are unlikely ever to be implemented in pure form (2000, p.
313). They counsel educators and other practitioners to understand how these and other
reforms are actually working for a reality check (2000. p. 5).
If we in the United States are to take this advice, many knowledge gaps need to
be filled. As the research cited above shows, much of the predicted efficiency of
market-based school reform is tied to competition and its capacity to cause reform
40
within competing schools. However, there is little research that details how and if this
competition is working on the ground or if it is connected to improvements in the
competing schools. The proper functioning of the elements of the market model are
core concerns if the market-based reform model is to be effective. Yet, there is little
research on how families are performing their roles as consumers. A larger question is
whether these families have the information in the appropriate form that would enable
them to make rational choices. Further, there is little research on how families are able
to tell the sellers about the schools they want for their children.
The purpose of this research is not to answer all those questions, but rather to
examine a part of this puzzle: to explore how high school principals of charter, public,
and voucher-receiving private schools in the District of Columbia think about
competition, how they engage in recruitment based on their enrollment pressures, and
how they use information to recruit. Hopefully, these findings will inform policy and
provide information to practitioners about corrections that need to be made to improve
the performance of schools receiving public funds to educate D.C. students.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Introduction and Conceptual Framework
This chapter outlines the research design used for this qualitative study of the
conditions of and attitudes toward competition among the principals of three types of
schools serving D.C. public high school students and how this competition or lack of
competition affects the way these principals use information. As discussed in the
literature review in Chapter 2, market-based school reform is predicated on efficiencies
believed to be present in the business model of competition: schools compete (for
market share), they perform well or lose students (customers), and eventually thrive or
close. The market-based school reform theory predicts that this competition will be
played out through the recruitment and retention of students and families to specific
schools that have the desired characteristics and programs. An implicit assumption is
that there will be information on which students and families base their choices and that
this information will be part of the recruitment process. However, the author of this
study found little available research into or oversight/monitoring of the competition
between types of schools and how that competition is expressed in the recruitment
practices of the various types of schools.
This study sought to provide insights into the competition found among the
hybrid system of schools in the District of Columbia. To do this, the study explores the
thinking of the school leaders who determine which actions will be taken to recruit
students and the infonnation to be provided to the families considering schooling
options. In the District, with some exceptions, the school leaders responsible for
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developing recruitment strategies are the building principals ofDCPS ’ or head
administrators and principals of charter schools and private schools that receive funding
from vouchers. Principals were interviewed to better understand how and if market
competition, which is seen as a dynamic process of rivalry and contention, not a
market structure (Veblen [1904] 1932, 218) (Baskoy, 2003, 1 5) is occurring. In other
words, market-based education competition requires the intentional actions of school
leaders; it does not happen through the mere existence of education alternatives.
This study also sought to add to our understanding of how acknowledging a
need to compete influences school leaders as they recruit and explain the advantages of
their schools to students and families. For example, if the school is under-enrolled, will
its principal recruit, and strive to make better use of infonnation materials to support
that recruiting effort, more aggressively than a principal with a fully subscribed school?
If so, are they competing for the same students? Are they competing with the same set
of school alternatives? Are they competing on the same criteria, like against like, or are
they trying to distinguish their schools by advertising that they provide different or
more specialized education? These questions are at the heart of the debate of how or if
the desirable aspect of the business model improved service through competition to
provide like goods can effectively be applied to public education.
As will be seen in Chapter 4, the environment in which schools serving D.C.
public school students operate does not support open competition; rather, federal
intervention and unequal funding give advantages to charter schools and voucher-
receiving private schools over the publicly directed system, DCPS. Increasing our
understanding of how D.C. school leaders view this environment and how they actually
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engage in competitive behavior on this uneven field will aid education policy makers in
determining what, if any, corrections or supports are needed to enable more efficient
competition or whether administrative mechanisms or interventions are needed to
improve the functioning of the three types of schools receiving public funds.
Research Questions
The purpose of this study is to explore the nature of competition among the
principals of three types of schools serving D.C. public high school students and how
this competition or lack of competition affects the way these principals use information.
The questions asked were: 1 ) Do the principals see themselves in competition with
other types of high schools? 2) Do the principals feel a need to increase enrollment and
what do they see as consequences of low enrollment? 3) What are their recruitment
strategies? and 4) Does their use of information materials reflect their need to recruit?
Data was gathered through interviews with principals or head administrators from each
of the three types of schools to determine how they were thinking about these issues.
Also, analyses were made of the schools recruitment information and web sites in
order to answer these questions.
Research Design
A qualitative, methodological approach using interviews was chosen for this
study for several reasons. First, the relatively small number of participants/subjects
raised a question of whether any useful statistical statement could be made from this
small sample. Furthermore, the goal was to study the motivations and behaviors of the
principals topics that did not lend themselves to statistical analysis, and so open-ended
questions would best elicit the desired information. Finally, it was necessary to develop
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a better, more reliable description of the context in which the subjects make their
decisions before generalizations could be tested by statistical methods across a larger
number of participants.
The qualitative research method can be conducted with rigor and produce
reliable results that contribute to a larger body of knowledge. Research theorists such
as Gary King, Robert O. Keohane, and Sidney Verba in their book Designing Social
Inquiry state that they ... do not regard qualitative research to be any more scientific
than quantitative research (1994, p. 7). They further state that neither qualitative nor
quantitative research can be termed scientific unless it meets specific standards, the first
being that the goal in the use of the method must be inference. While valuing
descriptive research, they state that . . . science requires the additional step of
attempting to infer beyond the immediate data to something broader that is not directly
observed (King, et ah, 1994, p. 8).
Their second standard is that procedures must be public, meaning that research
steps and methods must be explicit to enable the replication of research. Their third
standard is that research results cannot be assumed: inferences without uncertainty
estimates are not science as we define it (King, et ah, 1994, p. 9). King s final
standard is the content is the method . . . scientific research adheres to a set of rules of
inference on which validity depends (King, et ah, 1994, p. 9).
These standards proved both challenging and critical in guiding this study.
The research was conducted in the midst of emotional debate and political actions
around school choice. The three types of high schools proved to be more different in
motive and structure than had been assumed initially, and so searching for supported
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generalizations about principal behavior across the school types required disciplined
focus.
Data Sources and Sampling Procedures
The research setting for this study was the high schools in the District of
Columbia that receive public funds: high schools managed by the publicly directed
DCPS system; public charter high schools; and private or parochial high schools that
participate in the D.C. voucher program.
The subjects were D.C. high school principals, and in two cases head
administrators, who directed private schools participating in the D.C. voucher program,
public/traditional (DCPS) schools, or public charter schools. The principals all directed
high schools that receive public funds for the purpose of instructing public school
students.
The study was based on interviews with high school principals and head
administrators because of their involvement with recruitment and the development of
information about their schools. At the time of the study, DCPS-building principals
directed recruitment and community relations for their schools. Each of the charter-
school principals and head administrators was involved in the decisions about
recruitment and the information provided to prospective families, if not the actual
implementation of recruitment. Again, the principal and head administrator of the
private schools in the D.C. voucher program directed recruitment and made decisions
about what information would be provided to potential families.
The study focused on high school principals instead of elementary or middle
school principals because of the increased interest of families and students at this major
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education transition point in schools outside of their neighborhoods. Although research
shows that parents prefer to keep their children in close-by neighborhood schools in the
elementary years, students and parents do see value in providing greater freedom and
expression of individual interest in the high school years. Furthermore, parents are
likely to listen to the opinions of the secondary-level student. In addition, high school
students are more mobile than younger children and can more easily reach the school of
their choice if it is outside their neighborhood. As a result, principals find that they
need a strategy to recruit students as well as families to their schools. Such strategies
may stress many factors in addition to academic performance measures of quality. For
example, the depiction of a vibrant student life can be a winning message.
At the secondary level, programs are more complex than those at the primary
level and more explanation is needed by families to understand options. To address
both the complexities of the high school programs and the emotive aspects of recruiting
teenage students, many principals develop recruitment strategies supported by
information materials and web sites.
The voucher-receiving private schools in operation in the 2005-2006 SY
The total universe of private high schools participating in the D.C. voucher
program was 8 schools. All 8 had the mission of preparing their students for college
and offered a traditional academic program. The major distinguishing characteristic of
these private high schools was that most of them had religious programming: 5 were
Catholic, 1 was religiously based, and 2 were secular. The voucher-receiving private
high schools in the study, one Catholic and one religiously-based, were chosen to
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reflect the predominance of religiously based private schools in the D.C. voucher
program.
The charter high schools in operation in the 2005-2006 SY
Of the total universe of 15 charter high schools in operation in the school year
2004-2005, 4 stated that their missions was to prepare students for the world of work
and provide technical training; 6 emphasized preparation for college entry; 1 was an
adult education program; 2 were boarding schools 1 for emotionally disturbed
students and 1 with a college preparatory curriculum; 1 was for students with children;
and 1 was for students who hadn t succeeded in other schools.
Of the 6 charter schools in the study, 5 had college preparatory curriculums and
1 had a vocational/academic curriculum.
DCPS schools in operation in the 2005-2006 SY
Of the 20 DCPS high schools in operation in the 2005-2006 SY, 7 were termed
by DCPS to be specialized high schools that recruit citywide and have no attendance
boundary other than the boundary of the District. All students attending specialized
schools are admitted through a school-based application process. Four of these schools
require that students test well and maintain high grade-point averages, as well as
complete essays and provide recommendations from counselors and teachers. Two of
the specialized schools are slightly under-enrolled; the remainder are usually over-
subscribed
Ten DCPS high schools are termed neighborhood schools because the majority
of their students come from within their designated boundary. Neighborhood schools
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frequently are the placement of last recourse for students having difficulties at other
schools, including transfers from charter schools or from the D.C. voucher program.
Three of the high schools were for students who have left other DCPS schools
prior to graduation. These high schools hold classes at times that accommodate
working students, and students range in age from 1 6 to 70.
The DCPS high schools in the study included 2 neighborhood schools, 1 stay-in-
school school, and 5 specialized schools.
In summary, in the school year 2005-2006, the total universe of principals
directing high schools in the District that received public school students was 43: 8
private high schools receiving vouchers; 15 public charter high schools, and 20 high
schools operated by DCPS. Two private-school principals, 4 charter-school principals.
2 charter-school head administrators, and 8 DCPS principals were interviewed for the
study. (See the table below.)
Table 2. Principals and head administrators in study
Principals and Head Administrators in Study
8 Private High Schools
Participated in the DC
Voucher Program in the
2005-2006 Academic Year
15 Charter High Schools
Were in Operation in the
2005-2006 Academic Year
20 DCPS High Schools
Were in Operation in the
2005-2006 Academic Year
Interviews with:
1 head administrator of a
Catholic high school
1 principal of a religiously-
based high school
Interviews with:
2 head administrators
4 principals
(5 were directing college-
bound programs; 1 directed a
vocational school)
Interviews with:
2 neighborhood schools
1 stay-in-school school
5 specialized schools with
citywide enrollment
The decision to participate in the study was completely that of the individual
principal. The charter school principals had no objection to having their interviews tape
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recorded. However, the administration of DCPS placed a restriction on tape recording.
(See Appendix B.)
Data Collection Strategies
The study used 2 methods of data collection: interviews with principals and
head administrators of charter, DCPS, and private voucher-receiving high schools, and
collection of information material and review of web sites of each school whose
principal or head administrator had been interviewed.
An interview protocol was developed that contained open-ended questions that
gave the principals ample opportunity to explain thoroughly their 1 ) opinions about
school choice and competitive recruitment, 2) thinking about how they should direct
recruitment activities, and 3) actual decisions and actions.
The researcher presented a consent form (see Appendix B) to all participants
and explained in clear terms that they had every right to decide on their own to be in the
study and that if they decided to be in the study, they had the right to tell her that they
did not want to continue with the study and to stop being in the study at any time. One
principal decided not to begin the interview after reviewing the hypotheses of the study
because he did not have time to think about these issues. This principal is not included
in the results of this study and no inference is made regarding the decision not to
participate.
Charter- and private-school principals were able to decide to participate without
consulting their boards or other authorities. DCPS principals, on the other hand,
required that the researcher obtain permission from the central office (a process that
took more than 5 months). One of the requirements for DCPS participation was that the
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schools not be identified by name and that every effort be made to conceal the identity
of the principal.
The 5 charter-school principals and 1 private-school head administrator agreed
to be tape recorded during their interviews. DCPS required that no tape recorder be
used during the interview with its principals. The researcher took notes during the
DCPS interviews and then typed up these notes as soon as possible after the interviews.
One charter school head administrator asked to be interviewed via email. He
was sent the questions that were asked of all interviewees, to which he responded. The
researcher then asked follow-up questions via email, to which the interviewee rapidly
responded.
One private school principal was interviewed in the street outside her school
because students were having time out and she did not want to talk in front of them.
The street noise made tape recording impossible. Interviews that were conducted
without a tape recorder were paraphrased and typed within an hour after the interview.
Each principal was interviewed once face-to-face, with the exception of the head
administrator who was interviewed via email. All of the interviews lasted at least 15
minutes.
At the end of each interview, interviewees were asked for the materials they
used for recruitment purposes. They also were asked to confirm the URL of their web
sites.
The interviews were conducted from October 2005 to March 2006.
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Interaction and Contamination Effects
Three of the interviewees agreed to participate in the study because they
themselves were working on their doctoral degrees. During all 3 interviews, these
principals expressed interest in why the researcher had framed a question in a certain
way and wanted to discuss data gathering strategies. The researcher does not feel that
this interest in the actual study design influenced their responses.
Two of the charter-school principals expressed concern about what they felt
were negative opinions about charter schools in the community. They referenced a
listserv that represented citizens who wanted to stop the threat of charter schools. It is
possible that they would have been freer with their responses if they had not had such
concerns. For example, they might have admitted to more intentional competition with
DCPS high schools if they did not have these concerns.
Research Analysis
Several factors required caution in the analysis of the results of this study. The
number of subjects limits statements that could be interpreted as definitive. Further,
willingness on the part of the participants and their institutions was a major
consideration in selection of participants. Data gathering was hampered by the tight
schedules of the principals and, in some cases, the restrictions set by DCPS. As a
result, some principals gave lengthy interviews, which were tape recorded, while others,
at the request of their central administration, had a shorter set of questions and were not
tape recorded. Thus, where comparisons were made across types of schools, the study
was restricted to the responses to the shorter set of questions.
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Grids were used to analyze and compare the participants thoughts and search
for relationships between statements and actions. These grids were converted to the
charts that are displayed in Chapters 5 and 6.
The information materials and web sites were reviewed to determine if they 1
)
provided information about programs and courses, 2) had elements of design (i.e., could
be termed attractive), 3) provided information of interest to parents, 4) provided
information about student life, and 5) were current (i.e., provided up-to-date schedules,
calendar items, and applications and other forms).
Chapter Conclusion
Qualitative data was obtained from interviews with 2 private-school principals,
4 charter-school principals, 2 charter-school head administrators, and 8 DCPS
principals. All the principals and head administrators directed high schools in the
District of Columbia that receive public money to serve public school students. All
participants were asked for copies of the information materials the schools used to
recruit students and these materials, along with the schools web sites, became part of
this study. Each participant was interviewed once in a face-to-face session, with the
exception of 1 who participated via email.
The qualitative method using structured interviews with principals of high
schools yielded a sufficient number and variety of responses, in sufficient detail, to
draw meaningful inferences on the competitive practices among and between schools,
the quality of information available to parents, and the degree to which market-based
competition was or was not affecting school decisions on education policy, program
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emphasis, and growth strategies. This information and the inferences from the
interviews are summarized in Chapters 5 and 6.
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CHAPTER 4
INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT AND CONSTRAINTS TO COMPETITION IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
The District of Columbia has a $70 million federally funded voucher program,
52 charter schools, and a centralized traditional public school system. However, even
with these structures and programs in place, their institutional contexts and constraints
have produced a less than perfect environment for competition among DCPS, charter,
and voucher-receiving schools. A major constraint is that these school reforms exist in
silos, each designed as a separate program and now monitored and evaluated separately
as well. Further, the federal support and preferential funding for both the charter
schools and the voucher program give them an advantage that DCPS may very well be
unable to overcome. Finally, DCPS mission as a public school of last recourse may
render it less competitive than charter schools.
The 3 sections below describe the major findings that the D.C. voucher program
suppresses competition; the charter schools have the competitive advantage of being
part of a national movement with financial and political support from both the White
House and private donors; and DCPS continues to be at a disadvantage because of its
mission and obligation to educate all the children within the boundaries of the District
and because of financial burdens caused by its role as the District s State Education
Agency.
Taking the D.C. Voucher Program Off the Table
A close examination of the D.C. voucher program (administered by the
Washington Scholarship Fund [WSF]) 10 reveals a program that shields the participating
private schools from competition. The program design, as authored by the U.S.
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Department of Education (DOE), removes the obligation for the participating private
school to recruit voucher students, restricts parents ability to choose a school, provides
little financial incentive to participating high schools to enroll voucher students, and
fails to make a connection between choice and academic quality. At the same time, the
participating private schools are given financial advantage: federal dollars to recruit,
raise additional funds, and cover administrative costs; exemption from NCLB; and
protection from comparison to their would-be competitors.
Private schools do not recruit and do restrict parental choice
DOE contracted with WSF to act as a quasi-central administration to orchestrate
the interaction between the voucher-seeking families and the participating private
schools. Parents are initially invited to a recruitment fair, where no schools are
present,
1
1
with only staff and volunteers to guide parents through the application/lottery
process. The interested parents then follow a lengthy process lasting several months
before they are told which school, if any, will accept their application. The steps are: 1)
WSF recruits and then rejects or certifies students; 2) certified students are entered into
a lottery; 3) the private schools select among the qualifying lottery winners (who may
be required to submit to additional tests and interviews); and 4) the parent chooses
among the schools that will accept their children. Parents may or may not get their first
choice.
12
In short, the WSF recruitment process morphs the D.C. voucher from a
method to purchase a choice education into a gift an experience like winning the
lottery. The giver decides what the present will be.
WSF further reduced competition by awarding vouchers to students who are
already enrolled in their private school of choice. In its first year of operation, out of
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1,300 students, WSF accepted more than 200 who were already enrolled in private
schools (People for the American Way, 2005). These schools did not have to attract
and sell these already enrolled students; rather, the schools merely accepted $7,500
(plus administrative costs) in public money to cover a portion of the students tuition.
Lack of financial incentive for private high schools to vie for students
In most cases, the $7,500 tuition failed to cover the advertised costs of
instruction at the participating private high schools. The chart below illustrates the
deficits the high schools covered from their own funds in the 2005-2006 SY.
Table 3. High schools participating in WSF program in 2005-2006
academic year
High Schools Participating in
WSF Program in 2005-2006
Academic Year
Tuition for
2005-2006 SY
Deficit Made Up by the
School
Academia De La Recta Porta
Web site: None
$7,480 None
Academy For Ideal Education
Web site: www.idealed.orq
$7,480 13 None
Archbishop Carroll High School
Web site:
www.archbishoDcarroil.orq
$7,600 14 $100
Georgetown Day School
Web site: www.qds.orq
$24,303-
$24,468 15
$16,803-$16,968
Georgetown Visitation School
Web site: www.visi.orq
$17,300 lb $9,800
Gonzaga College High School
Web site: www.qonzaqa.orq
$12,300'' $4,800
St. Anselms Abbey School
Web site: www.saintansel.orq
$17,300-
$17,500
$9,800-$10,000
St. Johns College High School
Web site: www.stjohns-chs.orq
$10, 520 18 $3,020
The D.C. voucher design permits parents to top up the shortfall between the
$7,500 voucher payment and the actual cost of tuition. However, few if any do. One
principal interviewed said his school s scholarship programs made up the shortfall.
Further, he said that although they welcome the voucher students, they will have to
consider the financial burden placed on the school as they continued in the program.
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The WSF reports that they try to ensure that no family has to contribute
additional money to cover tuition, fees, or other schooling costs. For example. Rock
Creek International School, serving grades K.-12, raised its annual financial aid budget
from $680,000 to $1,000,050 to pay the difference between the scholarship grant and
full tuition for Opportunity Scholars (Brenna, 2006, p. 14). WSF reports further that
funds were raised for voucher students to attend their class trips to Qatar and Jordan (p.
14).
Administrative costs of enrolling voucher students not covered by private school
The legislation intended that each student would be covered by $7,500 for
tuition and that the administrative fee would be approximately equal to the
administrative costs of charter schools and the central administration of DCPS.
However, the voucher program s administrators encountered unanticipated high
operational costs that were covered by private supporters. Brenna reports that:
It was very clear at the end of the first full school year that the cost of
administering the program far exceeds the funds appropriated for that purpose
by Congress. Congress designated that three percent of the authorizing grant, or
$375,000 a year, could be spent to operate the program. WSF initially estimated
the cost would be approximately double that. The actual cost to run the program
in year one was nearly $1.6 million. Private fundraising from foundations made
up the difference (Brenna, 2006, p. 13).
Brenna explains these costs as staff time needed to support struggling families
and students and expenses such as neuropsychological evaluations for previously
undiagnosed learning or other disorders (Brenna, 2006, p. 13). In other words,
voucher schools face costs that are absorbed by the central office of most public school
systems and, in the case of the D.C. voucher, a cost not paid by the individual private
58
school from the $7,500 tuition, but rather from additional federal monies and grants
from foundations.
Weak link between school performance and parent choice
The DOE design does not require the participating private schools to test their
total student body using a test used by all other private schools in the program or, for
that matter, by DCPS or charter high schools. As a result, a parent is unable to compare
the academic performance of the student body of a private high school against that of a
DCPS or charter school. In this environment, it is possible for parents to unknowingly
move their children from an academically superior DCPS or charter school to an
academically inferior private school.
In actuality. 6 of the 8 participating high schools listed in the chart above are
accredited schools that use a variety of performance tests to monitor their programs and
have reputations for academic excellence. However, 2 are not accredited and had been
in operation less than 6 years, and thus had no established reputation, when they began
receiving voucher students. (Private schools participating in the program must be
located in the District and agree to program requirements regarding nondiscrimination
in admissions, fiscal accountability, and cooperation with the evaluation of individual
students participating in the D.C. voucher program.)
Conceivably the 2 unaccredited high schools receiving voucher students could
have exemplary programs; however, without standardized tests and accreditation,
parents have no measure for determining which school is producing better academic
performance.
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Academic performance is not the only aspect parents consider when they choose
a school. The School Choice Demonstration Project, charged with evaluating the D.C.
voucher program, reports that among the several aspects of private schools, parents of
voucher students are happiest with . . . safety, smaller class sizes, and exposure to
religious-based education (Stewart et al, 2005, p. vii). Seven of the 8 high schools in
the D.C. voucher program have religious-based curriculums. This is yet another area in
which DCPS, the charter schools, and the voucher-receiving private schools do not
compete, because they are not permitted by law to provide religious programming..
No academic effect on DCPS
In one of the first studies of the impact of the D.C. voucher program, Greene
and Winters conclude:
. .
.
[The D.C. voucher program] has had no academic effect, positive or
negative, on the District s public schools after its first year. This finding
is different than most other studies, which tend to indicate school choice
programs have helped to improve public school performance. The
authors argue that a null finding could be explained by the fact that the
[D.C. voucher program] was designed to have a minimal financial
impact on public schools. They also suggest that the null finding could
be explained by the small size of the program, the short time-span in
which it has operated ( 1 year), methodological considerations, or a true
lack of a relationship between vouchers and academic performance in
Washington D.C. (Greene & Winters, 2006, p. i).
Summary
The D.C. voucher program has not induced the robust competition between
schools envisioned by market theorists (Friedman, 1962) that was to promote a self-
correcting system of competition in which good schools flourish and bad ones improve
or close their doors. The program s major design flaw is its dependence on a
centralized administrative structure, which protects the private schools from the need to
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recruit public voucher students and thus from any meaningful competition. Milton
Friedman s original concept of education vouchers envisioned a parent shopping among
individual schools, not buying into a school district. For example, the parent was to
investigate Roosevelt SHS, not the DCPS school district; Caesar Chavez Charter High
School, not a system of charter schools; and Georgetown Day High School, not a
system of private schools. Not only does the WSF program interrupt parental shopping,
it actually assists the private schools in selecting students rather than the converse,
parents selecting schools.
How the District of Columbia got this particular voucher program design is
perplexing. More straightforward is the tale of how national school-voucher advocates
managed to insert the first federally funded voucher program into the District. Hsu, in
his essay How Vouchers Came to D.C., traces the ... complex alignment of interests
among conservative education activists, the Republicans who control Washington, and
the local leaders of a majority African-American city and states that the legislation s
passage, the culmination of a nine-year fight in Congress, attested to the school choice
movement s persistence, deep pockets, and ability to capitalize on Washington
residents frustration with their struggling public schools (2004, f 5).
Whatever the motive, the end result was a voucher program in which:
Seventy-five percent of all participating schools (k-12) had religiously based
curriculums (Belfield & Levin, 2005, p. 5).
Unaccredited private schools, some with less than 2 years experience, received
public funds.
,g
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There was no capacity to compare the academic performance of the voucher-
receiving schools to that of other participating private schools, DCPS. or charter
schools.
The federal government allotted $70 million over 5 years for this pilot program
assumptively to further the understanding of and provide experience with vouchers. As
additional research reports are issued on this experimental program, there is hope that
some explanation will emerge of how this suppression of competition between schools
relates to the open-market concept of vouchers. At this point, it is difficult to
understand how using public funds to remove more than 1,200 students from DCPS
inflicting a negative financial impact of $9.3 million on that system" while at the same
time removing all elements of competition from the design achieves any of the goals
of the original voucher concept other than modestly expanding the choices available to
competing families.
Federal Intervention in Support of Charter Schools and Its Impact on
Competition
In a recent report on the District s charter schools. Mead titles a section. The
Strange Birth of Charter Schooling in the District of Columbia (Mead, 2005, p. 7).
The strangeness appears to be that Congress, with the urging of President Bill Clinton,
in 1996 enacted on behalf of the District one of the country s strongest charter school
laws. For D.C. citizens, whose license plates read Taxation Without Representation,
it was another instance of politicians not elected by them dabbling in their lives. As
Mead points out, the District, unable to handle its finances, had just been placed under
the authority of a Control Board. During this period, trust in the District s capacity to
take care of its own business was so low that House Speaker Newt Gingrich was
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emboldened to propose that the District be used as a laboratory for conservative
reforms (Mead, 2005, p. 7).
As with the D.C. voucher program. Congress attempted to legislate market-
driven education reform based on competition and the concept that poorly performing
schools would close. Today, 10 years into the District s charter-school experiment,
both the competition and the closure of poorly performing schools appear to be less
than robust.
Competition from a charter school or a charter movement?
When asked what his own research into District charter schools showed, Henig
was quoted as saying what anybody would find if they are being honest a mixed
picture (Dobbs, 2004, p. BO 1). And a mixed picture it theoretically should be. Again,
according to the dogma of school choice, parents are supposed to study the attributes of
several schools and choose a school, not a movement. Parents would be looking for a
better learning environment, better academic performance, a safer facility, or whatever
other characteristic they believe will be better for their child. That choice could be a
school in a centralized system or an independent charter school.
Academic performance would be a measure of a successful school. The 2
chartering authorities and the Mayor s Education Center report outline the academic
performance, as required by the No Child Left Behind Act, of each charter school (and
each DCPS school), and the both the Washington Post and the Washington Times report
scores as they are announced. Obviously, a detennined parent could find the
information needed to identify a charter school whose students are performing well.
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However, information on the aggregate performance of D.C. charter schools is more
9 i
readily available but with a spin.“
Academic w riters continue to aggregate the performance of the charter school
movement against that of the aggregate performance of the schools in the DCPS
system, as Mead does below in comparing the charter school movement to the DCPS
system in tenns of meeting Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP):
Sixteen of the District s charter school campuses failed to make adequate
yearly progress (AYP) under NCLB for the 2004-2005 school year.
Thirteen other charters did make AYP, and 22 do not have AYP ratings
because they have too few students, serve only children in grades that
were not tested, or are for adults. 21 of 5 1 charter school campuses, 19
schools, or 37 percent, were identified as needing improvement or
corrective action under NCLB, meaning they had failed to make AYP
for at least two consecutive years. In contrast, 81 of 145 District of
Columbia Public Schools (DCPS), or 55 percent, were flagged for
improvement or corrective action (Mead, 2005, p. 16).
Parents could rationally choose a great school in a poorly performing system,
and yet they could find difficulty in locating that high-performing school amid the
reports on the system of DCPS and the system of charter schools. For example,
researchers aggregate the performance scores of students in all charter schools within
the District to compare against aggregate scores of DCPS, as if a system of charter
schools were competing with a school district, DCPS (Hoxby, 2004). Obviously,
reporting aggregate scores allows proponents to state that the charter-school movement
is or is not doing as well as or better than a centralized public school system. The
argument then is made that more schools should be chartered or current charter schools
expanded. The argument is important to the charter-school movement. Presumably
though, what a parent wants to know in a system of choice is whether Hyde Charter
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High School is better or worse than Wilson Senior High School (a DCPS high school)
for their child.
Competition not causing many poorly performing charter schools to close
As noted above, 19 D.C. charter school campuses had failed to make AYP for 2
years as of the school year 2004-2005. Mead s defensive response was that an even
higher percentage of DCPS schools were in need of improvement. In fairness. Mead
recommends that poorly performing schools be closed, noting that [t]he dual role of
the Public Charter School Board (PCSB) as authorizer and advocate for charters makes
it hard for it to close schools (Mead, 2004, p. 30). (Advocacy is not one of the
responsibilities of an authorizing board [GAO, 2005]). As one of the charter school
principals interviewed for this study said, every time a charter school is closed, we all
are hurt. Apparently, the market model of school reform is weakened as the charter
schools join in federation and the federation protects its members.
Are charter schools given a financial advantage?
The same law that established D.C. charter schools required the funding of both
DCPS and charter schools through a per-student formula so that there would be equity
in distributing public funds to both types of schools. Charter schools were given an
additional per-pupil facilities allotment and DCPS receives its capital budget from the
District. Most charter schools raise funds to supplement public funds. DCPS can and
does raise funds as well. To this point, funding is equal for DCPS and charter schools.
The question of financial advantage arises, however, as the federal government
provides additional funding, financing packages, and awards for charter schools that are
not available to DCPS. For example, there is CityBuild, a $12 million federally
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funded effort to create or expand charter schools in selected neighborhoods (Chan,
2004, p. B01). An emerging scandal reported in the Washington Post over a federal
endowment for charters provides yet another example:
There is no evidence that the District s elected officials, including the
mayor. Council members and elected members of the Board of
Education, requested Congress to appropriate a single dime of the
millions of dollars that were tucked into D.C. appropriations bills from
2003 to 2005 for charter schools. But lo and behold, the bill for fiscal
2003 emerged from Capitol Hill with $8 million earmarked for charter
school improvements and an additional $5 million earmarked for a
charter school improvements loan fund to be spent without any
oversight by the locally elected government. More money followed after
fiscal 2003. Boasted a March 23, 2003 report by the Congressional
Research Service, These provisions demonstrate Congress s continued
support for the District's charter school movement (2006, p. B06).
Summary
District charter schools were established to give families school choice, so that
families could shop among more alternatives and schools that were unattractive or
incompetent would close. This environment of open competition has been
compromised by federal intervention and unequal funding in favor of charter schools.
Furthermore, charter schools that measurably are not performing are not being closed
by official action or the spontaneous displeasure of families.
DCPS Structural Capacity to Compete
Multiple reports and books have been written about the history of dysfunction of
DCPS. Henig, et al., quote an external report produced in 1992, a particularly difficult
period for the District, that describes DCPS as:
. . . an unstable and mismanaged school system with a relatively long history of
poor performance. The District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS) policies
on curriculum were judged obsolete and incomplete, with few schools in
compliance. Auditors found no method or means for systematic control of
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selecting, implementing or evaluating ongoing programs, with special
projects being ad hoc and the result of site-based entrepreneurship rather than
part of a district thrust. Among the most explosive of the findings was
evidence of DCPS-payroll ghosts persons presumably drawing salary, but
without any apparent responsibilities. Accounting procedures in the District
are so poor that auditors are unable to track millions of dollars of funds. For
example, much of the $180 million allocated to the district for capital
improvement since 1985 seems to have been applied to other expenses.
(Henig, Hula, Orr & Pedescleaux, 1999, p. 69).
Fourteen years and 5 superintendents later, DCPS has begun to get better marks
on its management and academic performance. The Council of the Great City Schools
reports not glowingly but with some optimism that DCPS has taken critical steps to
get its house in order (Council of Great City Schools, 2005). The D.C. City Council
recently passed legislation that should provide funds for the modernization of all DCPS
facilities over the next 1 0 to 15 years. Many of its schools perform well academically
and have strong reputations in their specialty areas. It also has a new superintendent
who has a vision for an excellent school system. As hopeful as this may sound, many
in the District agree with the recent Washington Post article, titled Big Plans Haven t
Produced D.C. School Reform, which stated:
... it s sweeping reform time once again in the D.C. schools. The number of
students dives every year: test scores are abominable; the expectations students
face in many classrooms are laughable; and parent involvement is maddeningly
slight. So, of course, the chronically underperforming public schools, forever
blamed for many of the city s ills, are gearing up again for total change (Fischer,
2006, p. B01 ).
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Declining enrollment means less money to operate
A construction/development boom and redevelopment or demolition of housing
projects has resulted in fewer families living in the District and reduced enrollment in
DCPS schools. The further loss of more than 1 ,200 voucher students and more than
15,000 students enrolled in charter schools had reduced DCPS to an audited enrollment
of 58,394 on October 7, 2004 (SEO, 2004), down from 65.821 in October 2001 (SEO,
2001). " Each student lost means less money to operate DCPS programs across all its
schools. In comparison, reduced enrollment in a charter school impacts only one
school.
Financial impact of DCPS dual obligation as SEA and LEA
DCPS currently acts as the State Education Agency (SEA) for receiving and
monitoring federal funds and as the Local Education Agency (LEA) for the operation of
its 147 schools. In this arrangement, DCPS is obligated to provide services to special-
needs students who are judged to require services not available within District schools.
In many situations the courts, not DCPS, decide where a student will be placed without
consultation with DCPS. DCPS prepares budgets to cover the tuition and transportation
of special-needs students in nonpublic schools. These charges have exceeded the
budgeted amounts for at least the last 10 years. When these overruns occur, DCPS
must recoup these charges from the per-pupil allotments of the students in its regular
curriculum. In short, DCPS reduces the funds available to its regular students in order
to pay for the transportation and tuition of special-needs students. Charter schools are
not required to contribute to these overruns. As a result of DCPS chronically
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inadequate budget for SEA services, it has had less money to spend on its regular
students than charter schools have to spend on their students.
The unique mission of DCPS may make it noncompeting
DCPS is charged with the education of all students of school age residing within
the District, while charter schools have assumed responsibility for the educational
programs of only students enrolled in their schools. (The D.C. voucher program has
had only to enroll a public student in a private school.) As a result, students who reside
in the District and transfer from or are discharged by a charter, private, or parochial
school have a right to enroll in a DCPS school in their neighborhoods. High-
performing students transferring into DCPS improve the average performance of their
receiving schools, while the intake of low-performing students and students discharged
for discipline reasons decrease the performance of their receiving schools and could
possibly have an impact on its attendance and drop-out rates.
Its role as educator of last recourse significantly diminishes the ability of DCPS
as a school district to compete with an individual charter school that has discharged the
low-performing student who will eventually enter a DCPS school. As in other public
school districts across the nation, the performance of DCPS is defined in many ways by
the school-preparedness of students residing within the boundaries of the District. It is
no accident that some of the highest-performing school systems are located in high-
income suburban jurisdictions.
At this point in the District s history, it is difficult to quantify whether charter
schools are discharging low-performing students in order to improve their performance
ratings is hard to quantify, but this possibility was generally confirmed by the
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interviews for this study. Several of the DCPS principals interviewed reported
receiving numerous charter-school students after the October enrollment audit. The
significance of the audit is that charter-school funds for the current school year are
based on the number of students enrolled on a specified day in October. Even if
charter-school students transfer to a DCPS school after that date, their per-pupil
allotments stay at their charter school for the remainder of the school year. The
advantages for the charter school s aggregate school-performance score and for
financing the education of the remaining students are obvious. However, charter-school
personnel and D.C. charter-school advocates make countercharges that DCPS, whose
funding in the following school year is also based on the October audit, wants parents to
keep their children in DCPS schools until after the audit and are relatively indifferent if
students transfer after that date. An aggressive student-tracking program is long
overdue and probably one of the few ways to determine whether the charter schools
and/or DCPS are gaming the process.
A competitive characteristic of a centralized system is its stability
DCPS stability is under extreme pressure because of rapidly declining
enrollment and the ability of the 2 boards to authorize up to 10 new charter schools each
year. The full-time charter-school lobbying organization FOCUS (Friends of Choice in
Urban Schools) reports that approximately 24% of D.C. public school students now
attend charter schools (FOCUS.org, 2006, 2). This enrollment shift, which took place
between 1996 and 2006, is enormous by any calculation and has been a shock to the
DCPS system.
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It is also worth noting that when a charter school closes (as 6 have in 10 years),
reabsorbing these students causes instability. DCPS bears the cost of collecting student
records from the closed charter school. Both authorizers have had costly experiences in
dealing with the liabilities and assets of a closed charter school, finding new
placements, and counseling families. A 2005 study by the Federal Government
Accountability Office acknowledges these unpredictable costs and recommends that the
District protect its large investment in charter schools by developing better processes
for closing schools (GAO, 2005, pp. 27-30).
Given the difficult mission of a centralized public school system and its need for
stability, as well as the experimental nature of charter schools, 25 out of the 40 states
with charter-school laws have established caps for the number or percentage of schools
to be chartered (Education Commission of the States, 2006, 1). These states conclude
that there is a need for a reasoned pace for opening charter schools. Such a cap could
be constructive in the District, but such a decision would have to be made by Congress.
The question is whether Senators and Congressman would be more inclined to listen to
the nationwide lobbies for charter schools than to a publicly directed school system like
DCPS with a mandate to maintain sufficient capacity to function as the provider of last
recourse.
Summary
DCPS appears to be losing its most critical characteristic stability through a
rapid decline of enrollment, caused in part by federal intervention to accelerate the
expansion of charter schools and place more than 1,200 DCPS students in private
voucher-receiving schools. As educator of last recourse, DCPS is required to receive
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students who are not succeeding in charter, private, and parochial schools.
Furthermore, because the District has not placed a firewall between the SEA and LEA
budgets, over the last 10 years DCPS has had less funding to educate its regular
students than the charter schools have had for their students.
Chapter Conclusion
The chart below highlights 2 major dimensions that influence competition
among the 3 types of public schooling options in the District. Arguably, DCPS has a
more demanding operational mandate than either charter schools or the D.C. voucher
program. Furthermore, DCPS is implementing this mandate with less money per
student than other schools have because of a structural problem that requires it, as SEA,
to cover special-education tuition and transportation cost overruns from its LEA budget.
Table 4. Operational mandates and sources of funding
DC Voucher
Program
Charter Schools DCPS
Operational
Mandates
Enroll selected
public students in
private or parochial
schools.
Fulfill their charter and
educate students enrolled
in their school according to
District and NCLB
standards.
Provide all D C. school-
age children with access
to an education that
meets District and
NCLB standards.
Source of
Funding
Federal funds and
private donors.
Federal funds provided all
public schools nationwide,
federal money for
expansion of charter
schools, local funds, and
private donors.
Federal funds provided
all public schools
nationwide, local funds,
and private donors,
minus cost overruns
from SEA obligations.
All 3 types of schools have hidden budget complexities unreported sources of
revenue or unacknowledged costs that, at this point, precludes an honest comparative
statement about what it costs to educate a student in their programs. For example, the
federal government may pay only $7,500 for a voucher student to attend a private
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school, but the real cost of that student s education is closer to that of a private student s
tuition at that same school. The real cost of educating a charter-school student is the
composite of the student s per-student allotment, federal funds, and funds from donors.
While DCPS cost per student is similar to the composite of a charter school, it spends
less on each student because of inadequately budgeted, non-instructional SEA costs.
These are the realities in which the principals of the 3 types of D.C. high schools
relate to each other. There are few points at which their performance or the
performance of their schools can honestly be compared, making it difficult to generate
the conditions of competition.
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CHAPTER 5
D.C. HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPALS EXPERIENCE WITH COMPETITION
As discussed in Chapter 4, the DCPS, charter, and voucher-receiving private
high schools are not competing on a level playing field. Yet school leaders in other
equally uneven situations have chosen to compete, often successfully. Furthermore,
DCPS and D.C. charter schools have been receiving their funding through the per-pupil
funding formula the capitation formula that fixes the amount of money that
accompanies each child that enrolls in their schools for as many as 10 years. As a
result, DCPS and charter-school leaders are aware that their enrollment levels impact
their total budget and ability to offer programs, and thus their ability to attract students.
Given that there is a limited number of school-age children in the District, principals of
all 3 types of schools are aware that they need to maintain their market share in order to
survive. In other words, there should be a clear motivation for school leaders to
compete with other schools vying for the same students, even if the environment in
which they are competing is not completely fair. However, the school leaders,
principals, and head administrators in this study almost uniformly professed an
unwillingness to engage in rivalry with other schools, an attitude appears inconsistent
with the perils they face should their enrollment fall below expectations.
Each of the principals and head administrators directed and/or were involved in
decisions about their school s recruitment efforts and the materials they would use to
inform parents families about their programs. The DCPS-building principals directed
recruitment and community relations for their schools. Each of the charter-school
principals and head administrators was involved in the decisions about recruitment and
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the information provided to potential families, if not the actual implementation of
recruitment. Again, the principal and head administrator of the private schools in the
D.C. voucher program directed recruitment and made decisions about the information
to be provided to prospective families.
Although principals have the authority to recruit and understand the
consequences of the failure to recruit well, interviews with 16 D.C. high school
principals and/or head administrators, suggest that most of them lack a commitment to
rivalry with other types of high schools with which they presumably compete. The
following themes ran through the interviews with principals of all 3 types of high
schools:
Support for school choice
Principals of DCPS, charter, and voucher-receiving private high schools voiced
solidarity in support of school choice. Several said that alternative education programs
are critical for meeting the different needs of students.
Little rivalry or contention with principals of other types of high schools
With only a few exceptions, the principals rejected the notion that they were
competing for students, preferring to think that students and families were naturally
drawn to their unique programs independent of their recruiting efforts. An interesting
finding was that DCPS principals did see themselves as competing with other DCPS
high schools.
Limited knowledge of their theoretical competitors
Charter, DCPS, and voucher-receiving high school principals reported an almost
total isolation from each other. They acknowledged little awareness of or reaction to
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the high schools with which they theoretically compete. Five of the 8 DCPS principals
interviewed could not name a charter school, while only 2 out of 6 charter-school
principals felt any competition with DCPS. Several of the charter-school principals did
not know the location of DCPS high schools. None of the DCPS and charter high-
school principals had any knowledge of the voucher-receiving private schools. The 2
private-school principals interviewed reported that they felt no competition from either
DCPS or charter schools.
The principals proved to be less aware of the politically charged world of school
choice and market-based school reform theory than would be expected from the volume
of research and journal articles focused on their institutions. Rather, all the principals,
whether in private, charter, or DCPS schools, thought of recruitment and competition as
necessary evils, and for some, an afterthought
Three interviewees were exceptions. Two were founders of their charter schools
who were subsequently serving in administrative roles and one was the first and only
principal of a new DCPS school. These principals stated that they were strategically
competing with specific schools and had no discomfort doing so.
The question of whether DCPS, charter, and voucher-receiving private high-
school principals are willing to intentionally compete is a core concern of this paper and
warrants a closer look at what principals were thinking. Below, the principals thoughts
are paraphrased or directly quoted when possible. (In order to obtain permission to
interview DCPS principals, the researcher had to agree to not tape record the
interviews. (See Appendix A.)
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How D.C. Voucher Program Principals Think about Competition
Both of the high school principals whose schools had enrolled public school
students through the D.C. voucher program found the use of the term competition
peculiar. They stated that their schools had not competed for their public students; but
rather, they selected students who had been pre-qualified or transferred students that
were currently enrolled in their program to the voucher payment process.
D.C. voucher-program principal #1
Principal #1 said that her students came to the school for the religious training
and that religion was taught during all courses. She did not feel that they were
competing with other types of schools because of the unique religious focus of her
school.
D.C. voucher-program principal #2
The second principal interviewed stated that. Our real monastic community
goal is to give the best education to qualified students regardless of their religious
background or their financial capacity. I try to find the qualified students who can
benefit from our type of education. It is not for every boy. The principal said that the
student recommended by the D.C. voucher program qualified and that the school was
glad to have him. However, he said. To be very frank, we spend so much time filling
out the paper work for that one boy that it really is not worth it to us to do this, except
for the child s sake. It is worth the time of two people working hours and hours the
amount of money they give us is insignificant compared to our real costs. I have to
make up all the rest of the money.
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Competition Among Charter Schools and with DCPS
The majority of the charter-school principals had reservations about
competition. They spoke of providing educational alternatives as opposed to trying to
steal DCPS or other charter-school students. Essentially, they believed that they were
matching students to the right program and that had nothing to do with competing for
them. In short, they appeared to want to minimize the appearance of competition.
The following are the thoughts of charter high-school principals, most ofwhom
thought that their programs were so unique that there was no other school that had the
ability to offer the same program.
Charter-school principal #1
Charter-school principal #1 said, I don t think the voucher system is any
competition as far as I can see. 1 think the parent looks at my program. They look at
what we attain. We don t have a problem with recruiting people. We are filled and
have a waiting list of 34. The other students who go to public schools, they have no
choice . I am a strong advocate of the charter schools working together and also an
advocate that there should be a common bridge between the charter schools and DCPS.
We serve the same population. These kids need to go to colleges. We all need to build
better communities that should be the common goal. We need to work collectively.
Charter-school principal #2
Charter school principal #2 said, I see our charge to be students who are in the
middle; the top students can make it anywhere. I see these as kids who we have to look
out for. They need people to believe in them, to push them. Our program is first and
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foremost character development, then college preparatory, and then family revival. A
family has to want this program.
Charter-school principal #3
Charter-school principal #3 said. Charter school principals get more into the
role of matching students to the right school. We are talking that way more. It started
that way last year. We did more about it this summer.
Charter-school principal #6
Charter-school principal #6 said. Charter schools are not in competition with
other schools. [Our school] is an alternative. We provide parents and students with
opportunities to handle vocation and career education. To my knowledge, until [our
school] there was not another in DC that had vocational education.
Two charter school leaders differ
Two charter-school head administrators held different views on competition,
stating that they believe competition will make all schools better.
Charter-school principal #4 (this head administrator responded to an email
questionnaire)
When asked to define competition, the administrator said. We have needs for
students, for faculty, and for administrators. All of those groups are in a marketplace,
and we need to convince them to come to [our school].
When asked about the benefits of competition, he said, [Everyone benefits.]
Choice, at least to a certain extent, can help schools improve. It s the free market.
Good schools thrive because of increasing demand (and additional funding) and poor
schools are closed because they don t have enough students.
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Charter-school principal #5
Charter-school principal #5 said. ... in a technical point we do compete, but I
see that our programs are so different that it doesn t feel like it s competition. It s like
it s a separate choice. I think that [a DCPS high school] would say that we compete,
because a lot of our kids come from there. They may feel the competition. I don t
because I don t have to search for kids.
How DCPS High School Principals Think about Competition
As the interviews below indicates, most DCPS principal feel that they are in
competition with other DCPS high schools, but experience little competition from
charter or voucher-receiving schools. DCPS has caused this competition through the
introduction of choice programs (specialized schools) at the high school level. (There
are some specialized programs at the middle and elementary school levels as well.)
DCPS operates 7 specialized high schools that recruit citywide with no
attendance boundary. All students attending specialized schools are admitted through a
school-based application process. Four of them require that students test well and
maintain high grade-point averages, as well as complete essays and provide
recommendations from counselors and teachers.
Ten of DCPS high schools are termed neighborhood schools because the
majority of their students come from within their prescribed boundary. DCPS is
required to accept all public-school students, including those transferring back in from
charter schools or the D.C. voucher program. Active parents are more likely to want
their children in the specialized schools. Dropout and repetition rates are high in the
neighborhood schools (actually beginning at the junior or middle school). For most of
80
the neighborhood schools, their concern is coping with returning students, not recruiting
new ones.
Eight DCPS principals were interviewed for this study, 2 from a neighborhood
schools (1 neighborhood high school had specialized academies), 5 from specialized
schools, and 1 from a neighborhood school designed to increase graduation rates among
students who had left other schools prior to graduation. These 8 DCPS high school
principals explained their experience in competing with voucher, charter, and DCPS
high schools. Their responses are paraphrased below.
DCPS high school principal #1 (stay-in-school)
Principal #1 stated that his program is not competing with other DCPS or
charter schools because it is a school that provided a second chance for students. The
principal thought that many of the DCPS schools were passing to his school their drop-
out populations. The principal did not have a detailed knowledge of any charter school,
but said that many of their students are former attendees of charter schools, most
frequently from [he named a charter school]. He said that his students had problems at
the charter schools and started transferring shortly after the school enrollment count in
October.
DCPS high school principal #2 (specialized school)
Principal #2 said that at first she was very opposed to charter schools, but now
she understands what they want: more control and private backing. However, she
thinks that they need more formality, such requirements to hire certified teachers and
provide a standards-based curriculum.
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The principal supports public school choice, but within the public realm. The
principal sees [her school] as a choice option within DCPS. She said that she is
competing with [she named 3 DCPS high schools and 1 charter school]. She said that
her school loses boys to private schools with football teams that want football players
who are academic achievers.
DCPS high school principal #3 (specialized school)
Principal #3 said that the idea of competition was strange to her, but of course
she is competing with [she named 5 DCPS high schools and 1 charter high school].
She said that their biggest competitors are schools in the area of her school. She
has no experience with the voucher program and does not know of any student that has
applied to the voucher program. She said that she remembered only one student who
withdrew to attend a private school. She said that her students are basically poor and
private schools are well beyond what they could afford. She said if we were talking
about recruitment, then yes, they do their best to get the message of the school out.
DCPS high school principal #4 (specialized school)
The principal said that any D.C. high school has to see that it is competing. He
said that [he named a charter school] is one of their major competitors because it is
residential. However, he felt that the most competition came from within DCPS from
[he named 2 DCPS high schools].
DCPS high school principal #5 (specialized school)
Principal # 5 said that choice is good and defined choice as the opportunity for
free education that provides alternatives. She said that she was unaware of any
competition from charter schools. However, within DCPS, [she named a DCPS high
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school] was a strong competitor. She reiterated that her school is over capacity, has
waiting lists, and really cannot complain about other schools taking their market share.
DCPS high school principal #6 (specialized school)
Principal #6 said that he believes in choice that every family should be able to
choose where their kids go to school and that a space should be available. He also said
that he is clearly competing with schools within DCPS that have selection criteria for
their students where students have to apply to attend. He felt that choice should be
the introduction of variety; not just seeing which school delivers the same old program
better. He wants to see diversity in design, structure, and organization to afford
families a range of choice.
DCPS high school principal #7 (neighborhood/specialized school)
Principal #7 said that he assumes there are competitive charter schools out there,
but he does not know the names of any. He noted that his school has a sizable waiting
list, and so it is hard to get too serious about charter schools. He said that he did feel
like he was in open competition with other DCPS schools [he named 4 DCPS high
schools] and occasionally a student will withdraw and go to one of these schools. He
said that competition among these schools was good and fair, but it was not good when
they got a student from [he named 2 DCPS neighborhood high schools]. When he saw
that, he knew that his school was getting the other school s best students and that the
transfer hurt such struggling schools. He said we [as a city] are not supporting those
schools.
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DCPS high school principal #8 (neighborhood school)
Principal #8 said that he supports choice, but that there has to be more
accountability for the use of public funds. Charter and DCPS schools should be held to
the same standards. He felt that charters have too much freedom and little
accountability. He said he feels competition from the DCPS specialty schools; the
higher-performing students go to the specialty schools and get recruited in the feeder
schools.
Conclusion
The principals and head administrators interviewed acknowledged little
competition between DCPS, charter, and voucher-receiving private high schools. The
chart below summarizes the principals statements. Only 2 of 6 charter high-school
head administrators reported active competition with DCPS, even though DCPS
principals are reporting that charter-school students are transferring back to DCPS high
schools. Only 3 of the 8 DCPS principals felt that they were in competition with
charter high schools, even though 24% of public students mostly transfers from
DCPS had enrolled in charter schools. DCPS and charter high-school principals
acknowledged no impact from the D.C. voucher program, even though this program has
removed over a 1,200 (k- 12) students from their pool of potential students.
Seven out of 8 DCPS principals reported that they compete with other DCPS
high schools.
Most of the principals appeared to be uncomfortable with talking about
competition. However, when they began talking about their enrollments and their
recruitment practices, some described very real competition.
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Table 5. Principals attitudes about competition
Are D .C. High School Principals Competing?
Voucher Schools Charter Schools DCPS
P#1
Not competing for
public students
P#1
No competition from vouchers or
DCPS. Reputation adequate.
Wants to work collectively.
P#1 (neighborhood)
Unique second chance.
Transfers from charter & DCPS
schools.
P #2
Not competing for
public students
P #2
Focuses on kids in the middle.
Parents have to select the school.
P#2 (specialized)
Unique
From within DCPS & 1 charter
school.
P #3
Merely desires to match students
to the right program.
P#3 (specialized)
Unique. Competition from
DCPS schools & 1 charter
school.
P #4
Competing for students, faculty,
and administrators in the
marketplace.
P #4 (specialized)
Unique, but feels competition
from other DCPS & 1 charter
school.
P #5
Officially competes, but does not
have to work at it.
P #5 (specialized)
Unique. Competition from
DCPS schools.
P #6
Provides an alternative.
There is no competition.
P #6 (specialized)
Unique. Competition from
other DCPS schools.
P #7 (neighborhood &
specialized)
No competition from charter
schools. Competes within
DCPS.
P#8 (neighborhood)
Competition from other DCPS
schools. Transfers from charter
schools.
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CHAPTER 6
HOW D.C. HIGH SCHOOL PRINCIPALS RECRUIT
Whatever connotation competition had for the principals in this study, they were
more comfortable discussing their need to recruit, the consequences of under-
enrollment, how they went about recruiting, and the materials they used to represent
and explain their schools.
The high school principals did respond with interest to the following questions:
Do they recruit? Are there consequences for a decrease in enrollment?
Are they open about their school s pros and cons?
How do they use their print materials and web site to recruit?
Recruiting Practices of Principals of Voucher-Receiving Private High Schools
Two principals from private schools receiving voucher students were interviewed.
Principal #1 headed a recently founded (6 years in operation) school (K-12) with a
religiously based curriculum. Principal #2 was the headmaster of a prestigious Catholic
school. The 2 private-school principals responded to the core questions.
Do they recruit? Are there consequences for a decrease in enrollment?
The principals reported that they had no need to recruit voucher-receiving
students because they were given a list of students who had already been certified and
they selected among those prequalified students. Principal #2 said that his school
would have difficulty accepting more public students because the public students
vouchers did not cover their actual tuition cost and therefore the school would have to
raise additional scholarship funds. He said that his school agreed to participate in the
D.C. voucher program because of its Christian duty to serve poor children and because
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the archdiocese pressured it to participate so that the less-expensive parochial schools
could receive public tuition money.
Principal #1 explained that she had 8 public high school students, but 4 of them had
already been enrolled in her school. She is eager to have more public students, but she
noted that her students came to the school for the religious training that was integrated
throughout all courses. She said that she has no materials for parents because, as the
families already know about the school, recruitment materials are not necessary. She
also said that students come for the special care provided. For example, some of the
students receive breakfast, lunch, and dinner, which the principal cooks herself.
Are they open about their school s pros and cons? How does the quality of their
sales material reflect their perceived need to recruit?
Neither principal has materials specifically designed to recruit public-school
voucher students. Principal #2 said that his school provides voucher families with the
same materials they use to advertise their school to the general public and that their web
site was not altered for public-school voucher students. He provided professionally
prepared brochures that describe the academic attainments of their students, including
schoolwide scores on the PSAT or other tests. The school s web site depicts student
life well, with pictures of students, student activities, teachers, and administrators
throughout. It was up-to-date the 3 times the researcher viewed it, including schedules,
notices, and alerts for parents about testing dates.
Principal #1 was unable to provide any printed materials and had no web site. The
principal stated that parents sought out their school because of its religious
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programming and that there was no need to spend money on advertising. Parents know
about the school through word-of-mouth.
The chart below shows these 2 principals attitudes toward competition, their need
to recruit, and their recruiting practices.
Table 6. Recruitment practices of 2 principals in the D.C. voucher program
Recruitment practices of 2 principals in the D.C. voucher program
Competition Enrollment needs Recruitment
practices
Recruitment materials
P#1
Not competing
for public
students.
Was eager to have
new public
students.
Used only word of
mouth. Parents came
because of the
reputation of the
school. School
provided extraordinary
care services, such as
serving 3 meals, before
and aftercare, and
religious programming
in every class.
Had no printed material and
no web site.
P #2
Not competing
for public
students.
Could not afford
more public
students.
Did not recruit public
students. Recruited for
private students at
parochial and DCPS
junior HS. Held open
houses and summer
programs on the
school grounds.
Professionally prepared
brochures containing
academic attainments of their
students, including school-
wide scores on the PSAT, or
other tests
Web site:
Attractive: yes, hardworking
Parent information: yes
Student life: yes
Current: yes
The chart highlights some contradiction in Principal #1 s statements. Although
she does not acknowledge that she is competing, she does want more public students,
which should result in active recruitment for public students. However, the lack of a
recruitment strategy and materials would indicate ambivalence or an unreadiness to
begin recruitment. It also brings into question how the D.C. voucher program is able to
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present this school to the families of certified voucher candidates so that they
understand what is being offered.
Recruitment Practices of Charter High School Principals
Four principals and 2 head administrators of charter high schools were interviewed
(one via email). Below are quotes or paraphrases of their responses.
Charter-school principal #1
Principal #1 reported that the school enrolls 378-380 students. He said. We
don t have a problem with recruiting people. We are filled and have a waiting list of
34. The school has a specialty of math and science and he thinks this is a draw.
However, he conceded that his board required him to maintain full enrollment:
Yes, because of the budget. All our money comes from the city. We only get paid for
the students we have. So if you don t get the enrollment, you can t make the budget
you had planned for. There are a certain number of students you must have in order to
pay for what you need.
He said that when the school was starting up, they actively recruited: Yes, at
the beginning. We had a campaign to let people know about the school. We had
leaflets at the Metro station. We went to the churches. We talked to the clergy. We
went to different places we knew were looking out for youth. We asked our students to
talk about the school. We had open houses. We invited people in. We advertised in
the local paper. People got to know us. Now, he said, families come to them.
Materials provided by charter-school principal #1
The principal provided a 4-page glossy brochure that contained a brief statement
about the education program, testimonials from 4 students, a list of colleges their
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graduates attend, an application, explanation of discipline, and the dress code. He also
provided a 6-page, photocopied and stapled piece that describes the mission, vision, and
program, and lists course offerings.
Web site
The web site was attractive and student-centered, and made liberal use of
pictures. The information was up-to-date on the 2 occasions that the researcher
checked. The content includes the mission of the school and time of meetings, as well
as tips on parenting and application materials.
Charter school principal #2
Principal #2 said that his school s charter permits as many as 1050 students, but
the school could enroll only 800 because of the size of their building. There are 275 in
the high school. She said one of the reasons they are not focused on recruitment is that
they have a waiting list. They have to limit the size of the waiting list they maintain
because they do recommend to some families that they move their students during the
year.
She said that the school has not advertised, but that friends counsel their friends
to come to the school. She said that they held hour-long information sessions, after
which parents could apply if they were still interested. She said that the major selling
point of the school was the parent training and their right/ability to be involved. Also,
she said that character training for the students was critical for improving academic
performance. She said that they made sure that parents understood that family revival
was a major part of the program. However, she said that her admissions officer did visit
DCPS middle schools to talk about the program.
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She was adamant that the public has a right to know everything about the school
and that they explain the academic performance of the school to the parents. She said it
is disturbing that the general public was not told the whole story about the school s
performance. She said that they have highly qualified teachers and achieved AYP in
reading this year. Even though the school failed to achieve AYP in math, and thus is
labeled a school in need of improvement, she felt that the school had not been able to
tell its complete story about progress made by students.
Materials provided by principal #2
The principal said that the school was developing new material, but had nothing to
show at the time of the interview.
Web site
The web site provided a good exposure to student life through many pictures of
sports, theater, and other activities. Content included complete information on the
schools programs and mission, as well as sections for parents, sports, and other aspects
of student life. It was current on the 2 occasions that the reviewer checked.
Charter school principal #3
When asked by the researcher on July 28, 2005, how many students her school
had recruited for the fall, principal #3 said. It s changing every day because enrollment
is active and current over the summer. The last I heard is that we were at 100, which
was kind of a mid-summer goal for us. I know that we have made our goal of 100. Our
charter is for 150. Between now and the first day of school, our hope is to have 150
children who are perfectly matched for our program.
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When asked what she would do to get the right students for her school, she said.
For us. the leadership (not necessarily for the parents), it is more important for us to
have the right students in the seats than to have the right number. So maybe we are
competing for the same students as [she named two DCPS specialized schools]. We
may be competing, but we are providing more spaces for more students to have the [she
named a DCPS specialized school] experience. To have the college/cultural
experience the college-bound experience.
We are looking to the same pool of students they belong to the Board of
Education and we charter schools think we can do it better. We need the best child
for our educational programs. So that is how we are looking at it. And our
recruitment some schools do big recruitment, big signs. But we only need 150, so we
don t have to have huge recruitment.... For us, our brochure, and telling what goes on,
and keeping an open line with our feeder schools [she named both DCPS and charter
middle schools].
Materials provided by principal #3
The principal was unable to provide any printed recruitment material.
Web site
The entire web site was under construction from at least July 2005 to
February 2006.
Charter school principal (administrator) #4
Administrator #4 said his school was fully enrolled at 320 with a waiting list of
50-100 at the 7 lh grade level. He said that the school s board required them to maintain
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enrollment at 320 and to recruit: Our board understands that maintaining our capacity
is critical to the financial and operational existence of the school.
When asked what they did to recruit, he said. We build relationships with
elementary school principals to have them help us identify students for our program.
Outreach work, like we have done since the start of our school. We have always had
orientations and continue to build individual relationships with people who can identify
families for our school.
Materials provided by principal (administrator) #4
The administrator did not provide printed materials. He said the school asks
parents to visit the school and they provide a full orientation at the time of their visit.
Web site
The school s web site was one of the most professional reviewed during this
study. Particularly good was a slideshow that shows a day in the life of the school,
beginning with the early morning routine, classes, students socializing in the halls and
cafeteria, leaving to tie a tie, sports, clubs, and study hall. There is also a slide tour of
the campus and student diaries that give an extensive idea of student life. Below is an
example of a diary entry for the first year:
Dear Diary,
I m still having trouble with math, but I m loving my reading
class. We read lots of fun books in Language Arts, like Harry
Potter and Holes , but we have lots of homework too. I told my
mom that we have so much homework they even have a special
time called study hall so we can get it all done. My houseparent
and my academic teachers come to it to help us out. My math
teacher came every day after I got my C-. I feel like there is
always someone here to help me out, which is great and all, but it
also means I don t have an excuse if I don t do my work.
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This charter school is expanding to other states and its web site carries the
message and mission of this larger organization.
Charter school principal (administrator) # 5
This school had met its enrollment goal of 325 students in grades 9-12. They
had 10 students on their waiting list as of October.
When asked how he recruited, administrator #5 said.
You have to go to where the people are. You have to have fliers and
stand at Metro stops and talk to churches, basically anywhere you think
people are going to be, you go there and try to get your message out,
which is that [this school] is a charter school serving grades 9 through 12
in Ward 8 and in a short period of time we have had considerable
success in preparing students to get into and succeed in college and that
if you think your child could fit, you should enroll.
More people know about us now so it s easier to get people to come to
us instead of us having to go to them. But, in another sense it is more
difficult with more charter schools opening the choices for parents
become greater, so we will have to work harder. The net is that it is
easier for us now than before. But I think that we now have more
competition than we had before.
He said that he recruited at the DCPS junior-high feeder schools and got
referrals from parochial schools and a couple of charter schools. He said he had the
equivalent of a full-time person s job just to do outreach and recruiting.
Materials provided by principal (administrator) #5
This school does extensive fundraising and works intensively with the legal
community, whose members serve as mentors. The school s curriculum builds on this
relationship. The print material would be effective for fundraising. Glossy, bound, and
tightly written, it is comparable to a corporation s annual report.
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A very effective innovation was a DVD that was provided to potential students and
families. Student life is powerfully presented, showing students interacting freely
throughout the building, talking openly and enthusiastically with their teachers, and
participating in internships. The school s founder stresses the school s mission and his
aspirations for its students. Students, teachers and law partners make motivational
statements and a parent testifies about how her child benefits from attending the school.
The DVD more effectively says anything that could have been put into a static
brochure, particularly for parents who may not read easily.
Web site
The web site was all business mission statement, application and enrollment
schedule, graduation plans, and fundraising events. There were few pictures.
Charter-school principal #6
Principal #6 was not clear about her enrollment target. The first year (2004) the
school enrolled 108 students in the 9
th
grade. The second year, the school was to add a
10
th
grade. At the time of the interview, the school was in startup mode and recruiting
its second class. She said they were using mostly word-of-mouth to recruit and were
counting on students coming because of the vocational classes. She said many of her
students had special needs.
Materials provided by principal # 6
The receptionist provided an application and offered to print out a brochure
from their web site. That brochure was one page, gave an incorrect URL for the web
site, and listed the school s business and industrial partners. She said that this was all
the information they provided parents.
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Web site
The web site had one picture, of the building. The information provided was an
explanation of the curriculum; the mission statement; school year calendar; who to talk
to; and an online registration form. It also contained a pdf file containing the brochure.
The chart on the next page was prepared by taking information from the charter
high-school principals interviews to better understand which factors might cause them
to aggressively recruit and provide information about their programs to their
communities.
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Table 7. Recruitment practices of 6 charter high-school principals
Recruitment practices of 6 D.C. charter high-school principals
Competition Enrollment Recruitment
Practices
Recruitment materials
P#1
No competition from
vouchers or DCPS.
Reputation
adequate. Wanted
to work collectively.
Fully
enrolled
with a
waiting list.
Insisted that students
came to them and that
little recruitment was
necessary.
Print materials: Glossy brochure
plus photocopied information sheets
Web site:
Attractive: Yes, student centered
Parent information: Yes
Student life: Yes
Current: Yes
P #2
Focused on kids in
the middle. Parents
have to select the
school.
Fully
enrolled
with a
waiting list.
Said that the school
had not advertised
because personal
recommendations had
been adequate. Held
information sessions.
Print materials: Said they were
developing new material.
Web site: Strong
Attractive: Yes, student centered
Parent information: Yes
Student life: Very strong
Current: Yes
P #3
Merely desired to
match students to
the right program
Wanted
150, but
had 100 in
July.
Wanted high achieving
student who attend
DCPS specialty
schools. Recruits at
DCPS and charter
feeder schools.
Print materials: Not available
Web site: Under construction
P #4
Competing for
students, faculty and
administrators from
the marketplace.
Fully
enrolled
with waiting
list at the
7
th
grade.
Built relationships with
ES principals who help
identify students.
Outreach and
orientations.
Print materials: Give out only at
orientations.
Website: Very strong
Attractive: Yes, student centered
Parent information: Yes
Student life: Very strong
Current: Yes
P #5
Officially competes,
but does not have to
work at it.
Fully
enrolled
with waiting
list
Reported aggressive
outreach even though
the reputation of the
school is strong.
Recruits at DCPS,
charter and parochial
feeder schools
Print materials: glossy, bound,
formal for fundraising
DVD very strong on student life
Website: formal
Attractive: formal
Parent information: yes
Student life: very little
Current: yes
P #6
Provides an
alternative.
There is no
competition.
Not
apparent
Used word-of-mouth
recruiting.
One-page brochure
Ran radio ads:
Web site:
Attractive: Basic
Parent information: Yes
Student life: None
Current: Yes
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Summary
The need to recruit does not appear to be a motivating factor in how
aggressively the principals recruited or how well developed their recruitment material
were. Only two principals or head administrators reported a need to recruit. Charter
school principal #6 directing the start-up school would appear to have the most
immediate need to build a student body. Yet, this principal was making minimal use of
printed materials and the school s web site. This principal also reported that the school
was using almost exclusively a word-of-mouth strategy and radio ads to attract students.
However, it is difficult to determine if the school s use of this strategy was successful
since it appeared to have had no set goal for enrollment.
Charter school principal #3 had set for her school one the hardest recruitment
task to recruit 50 high-performing high school students in the months of July and
August. It is improbable that the self-directed achievement oriented students she was
looking for would still be shopping for their school that close to September, the
beginning of the school year. It was even less probable that a strategy of word-of-
mouth would attract many students, let alone high achieving ones, at that late point in
time.
Three of the six charter high school principals interviewed stated that recruitment
had not been a priority in the last couple of years for them. When they were first
chartered and began operation, they had to build name recognition and their enrollment.
They said that they had aggressively carried their message to local churches,
community groups and anywhere people were. Several said that they leafleted at
metro stops. However, these three reported that now that they are fully enrolled and
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have waiting lists, they no longer performed the same level of community outreach.
Charter school principal #2 continued to use informative, well-constructed print
material. Both charter school principals #1 and #2 maintained web sites that would
enable their larger audience to see and understand their programs, but these actions
were not because they felt a need to recruit. Charter school principal #5, even though
his school s reputation and standing appeared to be established, continued to recruit and
developed one of the strongest recruitment communication devices a DVD that
clearly presented student life, the school s mission, student-teacher relationships and
how a student can achieve.
Charter school principals #4 and #5 stand out because they both said that they
believed that they were competing with other schools.
These two principals (head administrators) were founders of their charter
schools and subsequently were serving in administrative roles. Both were exceptionally
aware of the funds needed to run their schools and the consequences of not reaching
and maintaining their target enrollments. Each was articulate about the benefits of their
programs and the hopes they have for their students. Two of the head administrators
provided professionally developed materials and referenced their web sites, which were
attractive and current and provided an exceptionally vibrant view of student life.
These two also employed fulltime public relations/recruitment personnel. The
principals explained that these staff worked on development both fund-raising and
recruitment. Both of these schools have extensive building programs and raised funds
to cover their operating expenses.
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Also of note: Two of the principals reported that they kept their waiting lists
open to the middle of the school year because they advise students who do not perform
academically or have discipline problems to leave the school and find other schooling
options. They then enrolled students from the waiting list, who are apparently willing
to leave their current school at midyear.
Recruitment Practices of DCPS Principals
Eight DCPS principals were interviewed for this study: one from a neighborhood
school, one from a neighborhood high school with specialized academies, five from
specialized schools, and one from a school designed to increase graduation rates among
students who had left other schools prior to graduation. One neighborhood school was
under-enrolled by 20 to 30 percent. The responses of the eight DCPS high school
principals to the core questions are paraphrased below.
DCPS principal #1 (neighborhood/older students)
Principal #1 said that he registers students all through the year and that they
have over 700 students registered even though they have room for about 100 students.
He said that clearly staying in and completing school continues to be the problem for
these students. Also, he said that many of the students need the special-education
support services that they can get through the program until they are 21. The school s
enrollment was fluid, with students returning repeatedly and again to try again.
Fliers are posted around the community. Most students walk in.
Materials provided by principal #1
Principal #1 provided two handouts that his school uses for recruitment. One, a
glossy one-sided flier, cleanly presents the information needed to get the student in to
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talk to a counselor: Register NOW [at any time during the year]; phone number;
location and public transportation directions; list of skill training areas; and a statement
at the bottom that it provides an outline of how to complete a high school diploma or
licensing program. The second piece, a two-sided Xeroxed 8 V2 X 1 1 handout, gives
additional details: age and residency requirements and the requirements and goals of the
diploma and the vocational programs.
Web site
The school had no web site.
DCPS principal #2 (specialized)
Principal #2 said that her school was slightly under-enrolled: capacity was 425
while opening enrollment was 412. The school has challenging academic eligibility
requirements and is the only D.C. high school that offers the International
Baccalaureate degree. The principal said they had no waiting list because they accepted
all students that met the selection criteria.
The principal said they were taking their under-enrollment seriously and had put
together a recruitment committee that was upgrading the web site and producing more
materials. She said that they would have to go to many more schools. She said that
arranging student-to-student events worked very well and that their students were their
most aggressive recruiters. She noted that DCPS had canceled their Showcase of
Schools, which she had found to be a useful event. Now she will have to find many
other ways to reach as many students citywide.
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Materials provided by principal #2
The principal provided a folder with numerous 8 XA X 11 photocopied sheets
detailing the following: the school s academic performance; the colleges and
universities its graduates are now attending; a list of commonly asked questions about
the international baccalaureate diploma; the school s ranking as number 8 in
competition with 163 other high schools in the region; the school s extra-curricular
activities and sports program; and an 18-page application.
Web site
The web site covered everything that was in the folder, but added more
information for parents and a great deal more on student life, which included a slide
tour around the school and a look at the students in a variety of settings. The site was
current the two times the researcher checked.
DCPS principal #3 (specialized)
The school has recently moved into a new, larger school, which has a larger
capacity than the school s fall 2005 enrollment. This means that the school has to grow
from 723 to 800. However, the school had a waiting list in February 2006 of 60
students.
The principal said that word-of-month was their best strategy, plus there was
considerable excitement about their new facility, which is very visible on a major
thoroughfare. For the first time the school had gyms, a cafeteria, computer rooms,
state-of-the-art library and a sophisticated auditorium.
She said that the school had a development officer who was working on new
materials that would weave in the new facility.
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Materials provided by principal #3
The principal provide no printed materials.
Web site
None.
DCPS principal #4 (specialized)
Principal #4 said the school had a capacity of 450 students, but their fall 2005
enrollment was 400. The principal thought that the 400 number was a better fit because
of hormones of students at this age.
He said that the school was anxious to get the best, most talented students in
order to enhance the school s reputation. They held three open houses in the fall and
recruiters go to the middle and junior high schools.
This school has a fundraising partner, a non-profit foundation. The principal
said that only management time and imagination limited their spending on advertising
and recruitment.
Materials provided by principal #4
The printed materials were professional and appeared to be expensive. A 60-
page Community Book, on glossy stock, contained professional photographs of the
students in a variety of performances and in social settings, as well as details of the arts
and museum curriculum and the goals of the school.
Web site
The web site was attractive and formally professional. It appeared to be more of
a reference for parents than for students. Schedules and events were posted. Support
services for students were explained. There were a limited number of photographs that
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gave a vague idea of student life on the campus. The site was current both times the
site was checked.
DCPS principal #5 (specialized)
The principal said that the school s enrollment was 340 in a building with a
listed capacity of 275. She said that in the fall they had had over 300 applications for
100 slots.
She said that students want to come to the school because its reputation of the
school s innovative academic programs, plus its location on the grounds of a university.
They have one open house a year.
Materials provided by principal #5
The principal provided a 14-page glossy document, and though it talked about
vision and philosophical mission, it gave little infonnation about the school s program.
It listed the colleges where its graduates would attend and congratulated its students
who had received impressive awards and quoted students about their experience at the
school. Corporate and university partners were listed and thanked.
Web site
The web site was attractive, but not used for news. There were no pictures, but
only lists of staff, events, etc. There was no current application online. There were no
updates between the researcher s first and second viewing of the site.
DCPS principal #6 (specialized)
The school was in its first year of operation. The principal said school s
enrollment would eventually be 800, but at that point he was adding one grade a year.
He said he aggressively recruited at as many junior and middle private, DCPS and
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charter schools as he could. He said he had a large waiting list, but the school would
continue to recruit in order to have as large a set of qualified students as possible. He
said that the school had frequent open houses.
He said that students who didn t maintain a 2.0 GPA were counseled out, but
less than 1% leave the program. He said that this program was not designed to deal
with kids who do not want to be in school: Our students have to want to deal with
technology integrated with classic education courses.
Materials provided by principal #6
The principal provided no materials. He said that his message was the school s
programs. He did not have the curriculum printed out, but suggested that I visit the
school s web site and review the complete course offerings for each specialist areas.
Web site
The web site was attractive but minimal. While there was a complete
explanation of the school s complex program, there were few pictures and no feeling of
what it would be like to go to school there. The pages were not current. Both times the
pages were checked, it had an outdated application form.
DCPS principal #7 (neighborhood and specialized academies)
The principal said that they had 1,482 students enrolled, in a building listed with
a capacity of 1,450. He said he is under pressure from his parent organization to reduce
the number of students. He also has to enroll students locating inside the school s
boundary at any time during the year.
He said he sent staff to all junior and middle feeder schools to explain about the
9th grade academy and the summer bridge program they would all have to attend. He
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said all students entering in the 9
th
grade attended the 9th grade academy so that they can
become acclimatized to high school in a protected environment. While they had to
voice an opinion about which academy they would attend in the 10th grade, all students
had the same curriculum in the 9th grade academy. Then at the back-to-school night,
they met with all 9th grade parents and talked about study skills and the PLATO
program.
Materials provided by principal #7
The printed materials consisted of two-sided photocopied descriptions of the
five academies, the summer bridge program and the 9th Grade Team program.
Web site
The web site provided extensive information and was current. It could be a
constant reference for teachers, students and parents about events, schedules and
administrative decisions. It provided a full picture of student life.
DCPS principal #8 (neighborhood)
Principal #8 said that the school s enrollment was 544. The capacity of the
building was listed at around 700, but there was question of how accurate that number
was given the uniqueness of three of their programs that required more space. He
conceded that the school was under enrolled and that they had lost 4 teachers as a result.
He thinks they are losing students to charter schools, but could name no charter school
to which students had transferred. He thought they went directly to charter schools as
they transferred from middle schools to high schools. He said around 20 students
transferred from charter schools into his school after October.
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He said his students live within the school s boundary and he does little
recruitment other than to attend events at the feeder schools. He said he held family
orientations and explained the student handbooks that contain the school s guidelines
and procedures. He said that seniors work with the incoming 9th graders to buddy-up.
He said that 9 lh graders frequently had problems adjusting to high school.
Materials provided by principal #8
He said that he did not have recruitment materials, per se. He used the student
handbook to explain the program to parents.
Web site
The web site is not current and does not appear to be used to inform students or
parents of events or schedules. There are few student life pictures.
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Table # 8. Recruitment practices of eight DCPS high school principals
Recruitment practices of eight DCPS high school principals
Competition Enrollment Recruitment
Practices
Recruitment Materials
P #1 (neighborhood)
Unique second
chance. Transfers
from charter &
DCPS schools
Enrolls 700
students
for 100
slots
Students walk in.
Fliers posted around
the community.
Information sheet for
counselors.
Print materials: glossy flier and
xeroxed 2-sided sheet with
program titles.
Web site:
None
P#2 (specialized)
Unique
Competed with
DCPS & 1 charter
school
Slightly
under
enrolled.
Capacity
425,
enrollment
412.
Recruitment
committee; student-to-
student events.
Upgrading recruitment.
Serious about
recruitment
Print materials: folder with
sheets on the school s
programs
Web site: strong
Attractive: Yes, student
centered
Parent information: yes
Student life: very strong
Current: yes
P#3 (specialized)
Unique. Competition
from DCPS schools
& 1 charter school
Needs to
grow from
723 to 800
to fit new
building
Word-of-mouth. Draw
of new building?
Print materials: not provided
Web site:
None
P #4 (specialized)
Unique, but feels
competition from
other DCPS & 1
charter school
Under
capacity by
50 students
3 open houses and
recruiters go to all
middle and junior high
schools.
Fundraising partner.
Print materials: 60-page
Community Book
Web site:
Attractive: Yes
Parent information: yes
Student life: limited
Current: yes
P #5 (specialized)
Unique.
Competition from
DCPS schools
Over
enrolled by
65 students
They have one open
house a year.
Print materials: 14-page
glossy promo piece
Website:
Attractive: Yes
Parent information: yes
Student life: no
Current: not used for news;
out-dated application form
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Table # 8 (cont d). Recruitment practices of eight DCPS high school principals
Recruitment practices of eight DCPS high school principals
Competition Enrollment Recruitment
Practices
Recruitment Materials
P #6 (specialized)
Unique.
Competition from
other DCPS schools
Growing its
enrollment
to 800 over
four years
Recruited at junior and
middle schools of
DCPS, charter and
private schools.
Wanted large pool of
qualified students
Print materials: said materials
were on web site
Web site:
Attractive: Yes
Parent information: yes,
complete explanation of course
offerings
Student life: no
Current: many elements not
current, out-dated application
form
P #7 (neighborhood
& specialized
academies)
No competition from
charter schools.
Competes within
DCPS
Over
enrolled by
32 students
Attended all DCPS
feeder school
information events to
ensure students
understood the
program at the school
Print materials: Xeroxed
sheets explaining the
academies and summer bridge
program
Web site:
Attractive: Yes, very hard
working
Parent information: yes
Student life: strong
Current: yes, strong resource
for school community
P#8 (neighborhood)
Competition from
other DCPS
schools. Transfers
from charter
schools.
20-30%
under
enrolled
Attended information
events at DCPS feeder
schools. Family
orientations.
Print materials: the student
handbook
Web site:
Attractive: minimal
Parent information: no
Student life: no
Current: no
Summary
There does not appear to be a clear connection between under-enrollment and
how aggressively the DCPS principals recruited or how well developed their
recruitment material were. Only two principals (principals #2 and #8) expressed
concern about their enrollment. Principal #2, who had considerably less enrollment
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pressure than principal #8, increased her school s recruiting efforts and was working to
improve its materials. However, a 20% - 30% under-enrollment did not change
principal #8 s recruitment strategies (his school was required to serve all students who
request enrollment who lived within the school s boundary and he apparently saw no
utility in recruiting outside that boundary).
Principals #1 and #5 reported high enrollment and instead of recruiting, these
schools posted fliers, held one open house, accepted applications, interviewed and
processed their students. Principal #1 was successful and apparently had no need to
publish a website or change the flier and handout that continued to bring in applicants.
Principal #5 was over enrolled by 65 students and had large waiting lists and apparently
saw no reason to use the website to give families and potential students a better
understanding of the school.
Principals #3 and #6 both had reason to closely monitor their schools
enrollment: #3 because of a need to enroll 100 additional students in the fall to fill the
new facility; and #6 to continue to add a new grade each year for the next two years.
Principal #3 s school has had a history of full enrollment and most probably will find
the 100 additional students through word-of-mouth, a strategy the school has found to
be successful without recruitment materials or an active website. Principal #6 has
aggressively and successfully recruited for his 9
th
and 10th grade cohorts using only the
dense curriculum and lists of specialized course offerings as an aid. (He said that the
curriculum is the school s biggest selling point and that it is well covered on the web
site.)
110
Five principals reported that they conducted extensive recruitment or
information campaigns for reasons that went beyond enrollment goals. Principal #2
needed to recruit broadly to attract the high caliber students who were able and willing
to meet the standards of her school s program.
Principal #3 needed to ensure that students (who were selected by lottery)
understood the focus of the program and the rules each student had to accept to become
potential students.
Principal #4 s advisory board was anxious to get the best and most talented
students so that the school could enhance its reputation.
Principal #6 recruited intensely because his school wanted a good selection of
students. The principal emphasized that the school was not designed to deal with kids
who did not want to be in school and that their students had to want to deal with
technology integrated with classic academic courses.
Principal #7 was under pressure is to reduce enrollment to closer to capacity.
However, the school had developed a 9th grade academy and other special emphasis
academies and the principal wanted potential students to understand these offerings.
The school attended all middle and junior high recruitment sessions.
Chapter Conclusion
This chapter reports the study s results and attempts to establish a pattern or a
relationship between principals need to recruit because of under enrollment and their
recruitment strategy. The number of principals representing their type of school is
small: two out of the eight principals directing private high schools receiving vouchers;
six out the 15 principals directing charter high schools; and eight of the 20 principals
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directing the high schools operated by DCPS. However, there is every indication that
the null hypothesis wins: there is little evidence of a pattern that connects the need to
increase enrollment and increased effort to recruit. In each type of school there are
examples of principals who are experiencing enrollment pressures, but who had no
outreach strategy and poor or nonexistent recruiting materials and no or uninviting web
sites.
Among the charter-school and DCPS principals are examples of administrators
who report that they do not emphasize recruitment because they are fully enrolled with
waiting lists a seemingly rational decision if communicating with the community is
not a goal. Also among charter and DCPS principals are examples of administrators
whose schools are fully or over enrolled who continue to aggressively recruit, have
attractive, informative print material, and web sites that draw students and families into
the vision of the school. Again, this is a seemingly rational decision if the principals of
the fully enrolled schools want to maintain their market share and communicate with
their communities.
Solid inference cannot be made from this small sample. However, the following
observations can be made. First, all three types of high schools had a mix of principals
with a variety of motives and relative desire or capacity to participate in a competitive
market of schools. In other words, not all charter-school principals were hyper-
competitive nor were all DCPS principals waiting passively for their central
administration to direct recruitment. At the same time, some charter and DCPS high-
school principals were not prepared to meet the challenge of inter-school competition.
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Second, a startlingly large number of principals in each type of high school had
no or poor outreach strategies and no or very poor materials and web sites. The
significance of this poor preparation cannot be exaggerated in a city that is in the
middle of a radical experiment in parental choice of schooling options. The excuse the
principals made was that word-of-mouth worked to maintain enrollment at their
schools. However, while the dependence on word-of-mouth may be a reasonable
response to communicating with families with low literacy skills, it also is a way to
ensure that families with similar backgrounds and affinities join the same school, an
action that could increase the potential of segregation by class and race.
Third, it needs to be noted that two charter school head administrators (out of all
the interviewees) met all the criteria for competent competition: they stated that they
were competing; their schools were at capacity and yet they aggressively recruited to
maintain market share; and their information materials and web sites were attractive,
informed parents, provided a slice of student life, and were current.
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY, PRACTICE AND
RESEARCH
Conclusions of the Study
This study found little competition among the high school principals of the
District of Columbia s large voucher program, its numerous charter schools, and its
traditional publicly directed school system. The study was based on interviews with
high school principals because, as the official representatives of their schools, they were
the logical strategists to lead competition with other types of high schools. However,
though the sample was small, it was striking that only 3 out of the 16 principals
interviewed had a philosophical commitment to competition as a possible path to school
improvement. While all the principals expressed commitment to school choice, there
actually was little rivalry among the principals of the 3 types of high schools, and the
majority of the principals knew little about and felt minimal impact from the other types
of high schools. Although the recruitment of families and students (customers) is a
major measurement for school-based school reform, the study could not find a
connection between the level of enrollment and the recruitment efforts of the principals.
Furthermore, 6 of the 16 principals failed to provide basic recruitment materials or
maintain web sites, failing to provide yet another critical element of competition:
information.
The study also focused on structural issues that could explain the minimal
competition among the 3 types of schools. The study found:
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The design of the D.C. voucher program its dependence on a centralized
administrative structure protects the private schools from the need to recruit
public voucher students and, thus, from any meaningful competition with other
types of schools.
The charter schools failure to maintain an independent status, but rather their
effort to join in federation, disrupts competition between individual schools
charter school to charter school as well as charter school to any other type of
school. Increasingly, the charter schools act as the charter-school movement
in competition with DCPS, rather than as independent schools fulfilling their
charters and managing their enrollment. Furthermore, the intervention of the
federal government through laws requiring the establishment, expansion, and
preferential funding of charter schools in the District has placed DCPS at a
competitive disadvantage.
DCPS has an obligation to educate all of the school-age children within the
boundaries of the District, while charter schools need educate only those
enrolled in their schools and the D.C. voucher program need enroll only public
students in private schools. This means DCPS is the school of last recourse for
students who have inadequate skills to succeed in the other types of schools.
DCPS is clearly at a disadvantage when its aggregate performance scores are
compared with those of other schools that practice selective enrollment.
Furthermore, one of DCPS major advantages, as a centralized public school
system, is its stability. The federally imposed voucher program removed more
than 1,200 students from DCPS, with a financial impact of $9.6 million.
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Similarly, federal intervention encourages new and expanded charter schools
and allows the chartering of up to 10 schools annually a rate that disrupted
DCPS ability to plan and finance its operations. This situation was
compounded by the failure of the authorizers to close low-performing charter
schools.
The study found that, given these structural barriers, the 3 types of schools during
the period of the study were not designed to compete with other schools.
Implications for Policy and Practice
The study s conclusions have implications for policymakers tasked with
ensuring that public programs reflect the values and fulfill the need of the public, as
well as for practitioners who are charged with making market-based school reform
work in urban centers such as Washington, D.C. The policymaker must address the
legal and moral obligation of providing education for all while dealing with such issues
as whether to enable parents to elect to send their child to an unaccredited, unmonitored
academic program at public expense or to sanction unequal funding for selected
schools. The practitioner whether a public school administrator, a charter authorizer,
or some other stakeholder must work to improve the mechanisms for managing
choice. School reform based on competition must develop or recruit an adequate
number of competitors. Head school administrators must be encouraged or mandated,
trained, and supported to provide adequate information on their schools academic
performance and programs so that it is possible for families and students to make a
rational, informed decision about the best schooling option. Furthermore, state and
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federal political leaders must be made conscious of the structural barriers (i.e., the state-
control of elements of competition) they impose that minimize or cripple competition.
Overarching Policy Concerns
District residents continue to express a commitment to providing equitable
education for all.
-
' As the District s diverse public school options currently operate,
however, choice appears to be the retreat from responsibility to a broader collectivity
(Henig, 1994, p. 9) that education theorists predicted. Throughout their interviews,
principals of DCPS and charter schools referred to what appears to be considerable
transferring between schools and the implication that these transfers were actually push-
outs students who did not behave well, had special needs the school could not or
would not meet, or did not meet the standards of the school s program.
An example of this failure to find a commitment to education for all is found in
a recent article titled Sisters are left behind. According to this report, a parochial
school expelled 2 voucher students, who were sisters, because their mother had been
attacked on the school s grounds by someone she knew. The school officials reportedly
said. . . . the girls were asked to leave because school and community safety were
more important than the education of the girls at that school (Mohammed, 2006, p. 1)
The only remaining option for students like these sisters appears to be returning
to their neighborhood public school. However, to this point, no DCPS administration
has been able to make all schools educationally or environmentally inviting or
acceptable. Nor have there been adequate numbers of alternative schools opening to
provide more good options for these expensive-to-educate students. Frequently, these
students are products of their troubled households and neighborhoods that are
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segregated by educational opportunity, economics, and race. Market-based school
reform has yet to provide an answer for their poor prognoses.
At the same time, the D.C. voucher program permits parents to use their
vouchers to enroll students in unaccredited schools and then fails to monitor these
schools to ensure that they are performing up to accepted standards. The students
continue to be a public responsibility, with public funds paying their tuition, and yet the
local public has little control over the quality or nature of their education.
As for determining how the District s school options are doing from the point of
view of the theoretical economist, it can only be said that it is hard to tell. The basic
question of how much is spent for a specific result cannot be answered. On this matter,
charter, DC PS, and voucher-receiving schools would provide an enormous service if
they would be honest about the real cost of quality education. As one charter-school
principal reported, his students cost the D.C. taxpayer only the funds they receive from
the per-pupil formula. However, extensive fundraising makes up the difference on what
the school really needs to educate each child. Some DCPS schools most of them high
performing raise similar sums to ensure that their students perform well. The D.C.
voucher program costs the U.S. taxpayers over $7,500 per student, plus administrative
costs, so that some D.C. public students could attend tony private schools whose private
students paid $18,000 - $20,000 a year. Again, the private schools instituted extensive
fundraising to cover the public students costs. Failure to be honest about real costs is
reducing the public schools to funding through lawn sales, gala events, and begging.
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Improving Central Administrative Mechanisms
As referenced in Chapter 2, Gaebler and Osborne state that the market model is
not always appropriate when there is inadequate information, access to the sellers, or
policing of poorly performing sellers (1992, pp. 291-2). If these conditions are not
present, the authors suggest restructuring the market to provide the missing elements.
If not, it may be better to stay with an administrative mechanism (p. 291).
This study suggests that 3 of these elements are weak of lacking. D.C. parents
are not receiving adequate information about school options, which leaves many with
inadequate access to options other than their neighborhood schools. Furthermore,
policing is weak: it appears that schools are skimming high-performing students and not
accepting their obligations to educate all of the District s children, and poorly
performing schools continue to operate. In the absence of 3 of the 6 elements needed
for effective operation of the market model, it could be time to reconsider an
administrative mechanism.
This administrative mechanism might involve finally reforming the DCPS
centralized system and establishing an effective auxiliary role for the charter schools.
However, there currently is a level of public fatigue with DCPS and, at the same time,
considerable political support for charter schools.
The solution may well require greater government control and stronger
monitoring of the 3 types of schooling options. As Whitty reports, every European state
that established a market-based education system greatly increased the size and
authority of its national education agency (2001, p. 15). Most of them adopted a
national curriculum and required all public schools to take centrally prescribed tests.
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The reported downside of increased central authority has been a reduction in the
schools time for creativity and level of independence, while they have assumed a
greater administrative burden and more local costs.
Most probably, the District will eventually duplicate the European experience
and establish a central authority, the equivalent of its own competition authority, to
better manage the interactions between the types of schools and protect the rights of
students. The core job of such an authority would be to ensure that the 3 types of
schools met their multiple obligations as educational institutions receiving public funds
to serve D.C. students. These obligations include a commitment to universal education;
striving for high graduation rates; preparing all students for citizenship, college, and
skilled jobs and meeting the academic standards set by the District and the federal
government.
Among the challenges of this new centralized authority would be to oversee
capitation formulas to ensure that adequate funds are provided equal to the complexity
and, thus, the expense of educating each child. For example, more funds are needed for
schools that have a preponderance of poorly prepared students who need effective and
usually more expensive strategies to enable them to catch up with their more
advantaged peers.
The authority would have to ensure that all students are in a school and ensure
that truancy laws are enforced. Imbedded in the growth of multiple schooling options is
the potential for students to get lost in the increased movement between schools, a
problem that was reported by several of this study s interviewees. Poorly performing
students appear to be more likely to transfer from or drop out of school (or be pushed
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out, if the reports are correct). The District is already experiencing a 50% dropout rate
and possibly more than 12% of middle and junior high school students do not enter high
school. At this point no D.C. agency is monitoring where students are, their transfers
between schools, or why they are moving. A centralized student-tracking system
monitoring all students in all types of schools is critical if the District is to address its
serious dropout problem. However, it is also critical that all 3 types of schools
acknowledge their obligation to universal education and become a part of the solution,
rather than contributing to the problem.
The authority would ensure that the provision of services for special-needs
students became a joint obligation for all 3 types of schools. The District has to move
toward ensuring that all buildings in which publicly funded students are educated are
accessible for the physically handicapped and space is adequate for smaller classes
when necessary for programs for students with special needs.
The authority would monitor the academic performance of all public students,
including those in voucher-receiving private schools and make this information
public. All schools would be required to provide comparable data on their students
academic performance, program focus, staffing, and other aspects of their program that
would help parents make reasoned decisions about where their children should attend
school. This information must be made effectively available to all parents, even if those
parents have low literacy skills. All the schools must become committed to breaking
the barriers to achieving choice for low-income communities and struggling families.
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Considerations for Local Practitioners
Practitioners tasked with implementing market-based school reform apparently
have little recourse but to move forward to increase and improve the conditions of
competition. Even with the litany of problems listed above, there appears to be some
satisfaction with the efforts of the new schools and structures. Even as U.S. researchers
fail to find impressive or even significant improvements in performance among students
who enroll in charter schools and voucher programs, they report that parents are more
comfortable with the new schools (Stewart, 2006). After considering many factors that
would indicate improved school performance, Schneider, et ah, concluded, while
choice may not be a panacea, and it may not be the only reform needed to address the
problems that plague America s system of education, we believe that public school
choice clearly improves schools and educational outcomes for parents and students
(2000, p. 274).
Basically, parents appear to like school choice for a variety of reasons. They
appear to like the idea, whether they act on it or not, that there is an available school
that may fit their child better and that they have a right to such choices. In England,
the battling political parties are offering parents competing packages of school choice.
In Sweden, the government appears to have come to grips with a gradual shift from
collectivism to individualism within the Swedish school system during the 1980s, with
education increasingly being regarded as a private rather than a public good (Whitty, et
ah, 1998, pp.28-29). They also have identified negative impacts caused by this shift and
intend to correct them. They note that it is too expensive to have under-educated
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citizens and that they have to correct the system s flaws to get the best from the
competitive-market model in their public schools (Bjorklund, et ah, 2004, p. 157).
In short, the practitioners need to get serious about getting the flaws in the
interactions between the competitors or the failure to produce competitors. This means
generating incentives for competition between the types of schools and clearer
sanctions for poor performance. Possibly, the leaders in all schools could be trained to
market and present a clear picture of the admirable aspects of their schools and
programs. With these statements available from all schools, families would be better
able to make comparisons. In short, each school would have to make a case why a
family should select it, regardless of whether the school intended to build its enrollment
through aggressive recruitment. Practitioners could then hold school fairs where the 3
types of schools would present the case for enrolling in their schools. Furthermore,
regulators should evaluate the practice of recruitment by word-of-mouth. One friend
urging another to join a specific school most predictability will result in a school too
defined by affinity groups a student body notable for its members educational
aspirations, economic status, race, or religion. Choice should provide alternatives or
options rather than enabling groupings for no other reason than the comfort of
affiliation.
Competition and rivalry: these are only games if the end result is not improved
academic performance and graduates who are prepared for participation in the civic,
cultural, and economic life of the District. The authorizers of charter schools must do
their jobs by challenging their schools to perform according to their charters and the
District s academic standards; if not, the authorizers should move decisively to close
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nonperforming schools. Similarly, voucher students should be removed from private
schools that fail to meet the District s academic standards. The Board of Education
must ensure that interventions are made at poorly performing DCPS schools so that
these programs are not dreaded neighborhood schools that provide students with few
skills for joining the adult world.
Implication for Political Leaders
In the District as well in the rest of the nation, much of the progress in
developing the hybrid set of competing schools has been at the expense of local
decisionmaking. States and the federal government have imposed voucher systems and
charter schools on local education authorities. Foundations and private funders have
poured fortunes into influencing local school issues. For examples, Washington State
held a referendum on closing its 70 charter schools and Bill Gates, the founder of
Microsoft, poured a million dollars into defeating it. In Detroit, an entrepreneur
offered $200 million to create 15 charter schools (Dillon. 2004).
This imposition from outside local democratic processes may give the voucher
program or charter school a toehold, but it also has the potential of making it an
unstable reform. For example, what does the District do when the federal government
stops funding the vouchers? More than one group in the District believes that there is a
plot to dismantle DCPS, the publicly directed school system, in favor of independent or
voucher programs. District education listservs buzzed when New Orleans chose to
convert many of its public schools into charter schools instead of patching its Katrina-
devastated centralized system back together (Saulny. 2006, p. A 13). Senator Mary
Landrieu (D, LA), in addition to representing New Orleans, sits on the Senate
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appropriations committee that oversees the District. Unrelentingly behind the
expansion of charter schools in the District, Landrieu finally had the leverage to
establish charter schools in her own district (or so reasoned listserv members). The fact
that Landrieu. a Southern Democrat, is considered a progressive and an education
leader by many in the nation.just makes the plot more byzantine in their minds.
It is difficult to avoid signing on to the conspiracy theory in the District because
Congress has seriously destabilized an already struggling system and given little
explanation of its intentions. DCPS has a substantially more complex mandate than
charter schools or voucher-receiving private schools, yet it is given a lower per-pupil
allotment (because of its function as SEA) than the charter and voucher-receiving
private schools. While states are capping charter-school growth at as low as 4% of the
local school jurisdiction s population, the District has over 24% of its public students in
charter schools and federal law permits the authorization of 10 charters annually. If
charter-school dogma is realized, several of the District s 52 charter schools should now
begin corrective action because of their under-performance as measured by NCLB
standards. Should this happen, schools will be closed, students transferred, and
resources squandered in the process. To many parents, this feels like chaos that has
been intentionally induced and, even worse for a very progressive city, it looks as if
D.C. s commitment to public education is under attack.
Recommendation for Further Research
Much more research needs to be conducted on the conditions of competition and
what qualifies as competent competition within public education because much of
market-based school-reform theory is predicated on effective rivalry and contention
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between schools. However, as this study shows, there may well be much less
competition than is needed to achieve the positive results envisioned. This study was
based on small set of high school principals in a city where an unusually high
percentage of public students attend a variety of schooling structures, an environment
that would have been thought to produce competition among the schools. However, the
competition appears to be weaker than expected for a number of reasons that need to be
better understood if school reform strategies are to be based on market competition.
Market-based school reform calls for a change in administrative culture and
improved performance in response to new incentives. There needs to be better
understanding of the incentives that cause a successful principal to compete
effectively. That question possibly is akin to another: What causes a social
entrepreneur to have the necessary committed vision and inexhaustible determination to
persist in seemingly intractable situations? A principal s salary is usually lower than
those of mid-level professionals in private industry, and so the monetary incentive
seems improbable. This research would be useful to those who recruit candidates for
the difficult position of competing head administrator, which is critical to market-
based school reform.
Another perplexing question concerns the conditions, attitudes, and life
experiences that cause a head administrator to fail to compete.
Throughout the literature on market-based school reform, researchers state that
it cannot be proven that the concept works until there is a large-scale experiment or
total-system conversion to evaluate. Unfortunately for the people ofNew Orleans, the
devastation of their city appears to have significantly damaged its publicly directed
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school system, which is now being replaced in many parts of the town with a new
system of charter schools as many students attend private schools on publicly funded
vouchers. This situation, again unfortunately, provides a significant opportunity to
study the entire range of questions about market-based school reform.
Chapter 2, the literature review, provides a useful framework for further studies.
Several propositions by Walberg and Bast, which can and have been tested, would have
predictive power: In addition to the issues suggested by this study, the Walberg and
Bast framework should be used to guide further research in Washington, D.C., and
other cities. Although the propositions are developed for macroeconomic research,
each begs for greater analysis of the behaviors of the presumed actors for example,
the first proposition: In school systems where there are no consequences for either
success or failure, higher spending will not produce better results (2001, p. 15). There
needs to be a greater explanation and evidence of an actual school system that has no
consequences for either success of failure. The proposition is much too a priori if it
is conceded that there is such a system, then higher spending will not produce better
results.
Many of the propositions appear to be based on commonly held suppositions,
but deserve further examination. For example, one proposition suggests a relationship
between the notion that private schools can be held accountable to their customers
and those schools can produce greater gain in academic achievement at lower cost
(2001, p. 1 7). Are private schools held accountable by their customers, or do the
parents of their students feel so lucky to have their child accepted that they pay
whatever is asked? In this study, 6 of the 8 private schools participating in the D.C.
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voucher program charge thousands of dollars more than the per-student allotment for
DCPS. How does this additional expenditure by these schools contribute to their
students performance?
These propositions need greater examination because, like so much of the
discussion around the market-based school reform model, they contain assumptions that
may or may not be correct about the behaviors and cause/effect relationships of school
systems and how they should work or are working. Greater certainty is needed, as with
the assumption that principals from multiple types of high schools with various levels
of enrollment would compete and as a result take actions that would cause school
reform. Too many expensive decisions that will be difficult to reverse are being made
on too little information.
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NOTES
1
Terrell H. Bell. President Ronald Reagan s first Secretary of the Department of
Education, describes Reagan and George H.W. Bush as being caught in the typical
conflict with extreme conservatives, who insist that there is no federal role in education
and the less done the better (Bell, 1993).
" This focus was sharpened as the Bush Administration installed Nina Shokraii Rees as
Deputy Under Secretary for Innovation and Improvement to usher in greater school
choice, which meant a voucher program paid for by federal funds that includes private
and religious schools. Top White House aides decided Rees would be the one to lead
Bush s second attempt at a voucher program, the D.C. legislation. They created a 97-
person group for her to lead at the Education Department, with D.C. vouchers at the top
of her list (Milbank, Dana, 2003. A15).
In the District of Columbia, fewer than 2000 out of 64,000 students will receive
vouchers in SY 2004-2005.
4
Just as Amy Ansell states about the Republican revolution in its 1994 takeover of
Congress, . . . the 1994 victory represented much more than the temporary infiltration
of right-wing extremists or the spontaneous combustion of reactionary sentiments by
part of the public but rather that it resulted from twenty-plus years of diligent,
conscientious organizing by new actors on the right-wing of the political spectrum
(Ansell. 1998. p. 2).
" Only a small sampling of sites supporting market-based education reform:
The Fraser Institute http://www.fraserinstitute.ca/education/index.asp?snav=edu
(Canadian Think Tank)
The Friedman Foundation http://www.friedmanfoundation.org/
Children First America http://www.childrenfirstainerica.org/
Center for Education Reform http://vwwv.edreform.com/
Thomas B. Fordham Foundation http://www.edexcellence.net/
Alexis de Tocqueville Institute h ttp://www.adti.net/
Action Institute for the Study of Religion and Liberty
All Children Matter http://www.allchildrenmatter.org/
Alliance for School Choice http://wwAv.aIlianceforschoolchoice.org/
American Alliance for Education Options
American Academy for Liberal Education http://wvwv.aale.org/
Black Alliance for Educational Options http:/Avww.baeo.org
Center on Reinventing Public Education http://www.crpe.org/
Education Policy Institute http://www.educationpolicy.org/
Heritage Foundation's http://wvwv.heritage.org
Hudson Institute http://www.hudson.org
Mackinac Center for Public Policy http://www.mackinac.org/
Manhattan Institute http://www .manhattan-institute.org/
Program on Education Policy and Governance http://wvwv.ksg.haward.edu/pepg/
Vouchers and Education Reform Homepage http://members.tripod.com/%7Ewvvx2/
6 A few such sites are:
Charter School Leadership Council http://csIc.us/ncsvv/tooIkit.asp
Charter Schools Development Center http://wvvw.cacharterschools.org/
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CharterSchoolLaw.com http://vvvvw.charterschoolLaw.com
US Charter Schools http://www.uscharterschools.org/Dub/iiscs docs/index.htm
Charter Friends National Network http://www.charterfriends.org/
Center for Education Reform http://www .edreform .com/
7
American Federation of Teachers http://w w w.aft.org
National Education Association http://w ww.nea.org/
Partnership for Public Education h ttp://www .everych i 1dcounts .or
g
People for the American Way http://ww w.pfaw.org/pfaw/general/
Anti Defamation League http://vvvvvv.adl.org/adl.asp
Rethinking Schools http://www.rethinkingschools.org/
" The National Committee on Responsive Philanthropy reports that conservative
foundations provided $7,242,750 in FY 2001 to promote school choice in the form of
charter schools and voucher systems (Krehely, House & Keman, 2004, p. 22).
’ A senior DCPS official interviewed in January 12, 2006, stated that the administration
expected DCPS schools to understand that they have to keep their enrollment up. She
said that funding is now causing them to make principals responsible for recruitment
and that if they want resources in their schools they have to recruit. She said that there
is nothing stopping them from spending their money for advertising, such as putting up
posters.
111
Actually titled the Opportunity Scholarship Program, which is operated by the
Washington Scholarship Fund, but the media refers to it as the Washington Scholarship
Fund (WSF).
11
At the February 12, 2005, Washington Scholarship Fund recruitment fair, parents
heard a short presentation, filled out applications, and then, if approved, received a list
of all schools participating in the voucher program but no literature on the individual
schools.
The WSF described the last step in their process that began in March 2004. In mid-
July families had to submit to WSF a form indicating which schools had deemed them
admissible in which grade, and their order of school preference. WSF encouraged the
families to apply to more than one school so they would have the best chance of making
a match.
13 As reported by the receptionist on 1/1 1/06.
14
I was told this by the office manager on 1/1 1/06.
http://www.gds.org/adm/tuition.cfm read on 1/1 1/06
1(1
http://wvvvv.visi.org/admissions/financialaid.asp read on 1/1 1/06
17
http://wvvw.gonzaga.org/admissions/nevv site/tuition fees.htm read on 1/1 1/06
18
http://www.stjohns-chs.org/admissions/fin info.html read on 1/1 1/06
|Q
Providing the participating private schools with freedom from oversight of their
academic performance makes the D.C. voucher program a stronger program, according
to Robert Enlow, the executive director of the Milton and Rose D. Friedman
Foundation.
20
According to the D.C. State Education Office and documents from the Board of
Education of the District of Columbia.
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21 Even Sara Mead s comprehensive report on the District s charter schools is marred
by a glowing report on a charter school with no mention that the school had not made
Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) 3 years in a row and was then classified as in need of
improvement.
j'j
“ The audited 2005 enrollment report is not yet available.
23
This commitment could be expressed this November in a referendum on a City
Charter amendment stating: The fundamental right to free educational opportunities is
a basic value of our society and serves as a foundation of our democratic system of
government.
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APPENDIX A: DCPS PERMISSION LETTER
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC SCHOOLS
Office ofAccountability
825 North Capitol Street, N. E., 9 ,h Floor
Washington, D.C. 20002-4232
(202)442-5055 • fax: (202)442-5026
Meria.Carstarphen(a>kl2.dc.us
November 16, 2005
Ms. Bonnie Cain
1753 Lamont St., NW
Washington, D C. 20010
Dear Ms. Cain:
Your dissertation proposal, entitled, How Principals Attitudes About Competition
Between Schools Influence Their Disclosure of Comparable School Performance Data,
has been reviewed. Approval is granted to conduct your research.
You are granted approval to conduct your research with principals in high schools
within the District of Columbia Public Schools (DCPS). For our records, each principal
agreeing to participate in your research must forward an email indicating their approval
to Dr. Eva Chunn at eva.chuniva k 1 2.dc.us .
Please develop in concert with the principals an unobtrusive data collection schedule.
Approval is granted with the following caveats:
• Participation by principals is voluntary
:
• Approval is not granted for you to audio/video-tape the research participants of
the study;
• No reference or attribution to individuals for whom data have been collected,
school personnel, school buildings, or the school division/district may be included
in the completed study unless written approval has been granted in advance by
the DCPS Legal Counsel;
• A copy ofthe completed study must be forwarded to the Division ofEducational
Accountability and Assessment as a record ofthe project.
We look forward to reviewing your completed study. Questions or comments may be
directed to Dr. Eva Chunn on (202) 442-5336.
Sincerely,
(original signature on file)
William Caritj
Assistant Superintendent
cc: Johnnie Fairfax
Eva Chunn
Drake Wilson
APPENDIX B: HUMAN SUBJECTS LETTER
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
HUMAN SUBJECTS INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD
Informed consent Document for No- or Very Minimal-Risk Procedure
(Principal)
Study title: How Principals Attitudes on Competition between Schools Influence Their
Disclosure of Comparable School Performance Data
Introduction to the study: I am inviting you to be in a research study conducted by
Bonnie J. Cain, a doctoral student at the University of Massachusetts. The purpose of this
study is to find out how principals level of commitment to the competitive model as school
reform and to the need for public accountability will influence the degree to which they
provide complete and comparable information about their schools.
I hope to use what 1 learn from the study to complete the requirements of the
doctoral program at the University of Massachusetts. The research will be placed in
the university library and will be available to the general public.
What will happen during the study: This is what will happen during the study, which
will take place in Washington, DC between April 2005 and October 2005. I will ask you to
take part in one 45 minute interview at a location convenient to you.
Who to go to with questions: If you have any questions or concerns about being in this
study you should contact Dr. Kathryn A. McDennott at the Center for Education Policy,
Room 433, Hills House North, 813 North Pleasant Street, Amherst, MA 01003. Her office
phone is: (413) 545-3562.
How participants privacy is protected: I will make every effort to protect your privacy.
I will not use your name in any of the information I get from this study or in any ofmy
research reports. Any information I get in the study that lets me know who you are will be
recorded with a code number. During the study the key that tells me which code number
goes with your information will be kept in a locked drawer. When the study is finished I
will destroy the key that can link information to you personally.
Risks and discomforts: I do not know of any personal risk or discomfort from being in
this study. I do not know of any way you will personally benefit from participating in this
study. The study will provide information on how charter schools, voucher-receiving
private schools and the traditional public schools in Washington, DC are working together
to serve the goal of educating public school students.
Your rights: You should decide on your own whether or not you want to be in this study.
[You will not be treated any differently if you decide not to be in the study]. If you do
decide to be in the study, you have the right to tell me you do not want to continue with the
study and stop being in the study at any time.
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Review Board approval: The Human Subjects Institutional Review Board at the
University of Massachusetts, Amherst has approved this study. If you have any concerns
about your rights as a participant in this study you may contact the Review Board at the
University of Massachusetts.
PLEASE READ THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT AND SIGN BELOW IF YOU
AGREE
I have had the chance to ask any question 1 have about this study and my questions have
been answered. I have read the infonnation in this consent form and I agree to be in the
study. There are two copies of this form. I will keep one copy and return the other to Dr.
Kathryn A. McDermott.
Signature Date
Signature ofWitness* * Date
*Witness signature is required only when the capacity of the subject to understand the
description of the project and its associated risks is in question or when otherwise required by
the Institutional Review Board.
135
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adnett, N. & Davies, P., (2002) Markets for schooling: An economic analysis. London:
Routledge.
Amott, M. & Raab, C. D. (2003). The governance ofschooling: Comparative studies of
devolved management. London: Routledge.
Ascher, C., Fruchter, N., & Beme, R. (1996). Hard lessons: Public schools and
privatization. New York: Twentieth Century Fund.
Baskoy, T. (2003). Thorstein Veblen s theory of business competition. Journal of
Economic Issues, 37(4), 1 121+.
Belfield. C. R. & Levin, H. M. (2005). Privatizing educational choice. Denver, CO:
Paradigm Publishers.
Belfield, C. R. (2006). The Evidence on education vouchers: An application to the
Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program. Retrieved February 5, 2006 from
http://www.ncspe.orij/list-paners.php .
Berliner. D.C. & Biddle, B.J. (1996). The manufactured crisis: Myths, fraud, and the
attack on America s public schools. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
Boyd, W. L. (1991). Public education s last hurrah? Schizophrenia, amnesia, and
ignorance in school politics. In D. J. Void & J. L. Devivtis (Eds.), School reform
in the deep South: A critical appraisal (pp. 19-36). Tuscaloosa, AL: University
of Alabama Press.
Brenna, S. (2006). Changing the Status Quo: A Year One Chronicle of the D.C.
Opportunity Scholarship Program. Retrieved February 16, 2006 from
http://www.dcschoIarship.org/Chantdng%20the%20Status%20Quo.pdf
Buckley, J. & Schneider, M. (2003). Shopping for Schools: How Do Marginal
Consumers Gather Information About Schools? Policy Studies Journal 5/(2),
12 1+. Retrieved August 10, 2004, from http://www.questia.com
Cavanagh, S. (2004). Reagan s Legacy: A Nation at Risk, Boost for Choice. Education
Week, 23(40), 35, 38. Retrieved June 1 1, 2004 from
http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew_printstory.cfm?slug=40Reagan.h23
Census ofStudent Enrollment ofthe District ofColumbia Public Schools and Public
Charter Schools 2001. (2001). Washington, DC: DC State Education Office.
136
Chan, S. ("September 8, 2004). D.C. Charter Schools Get Seed Money; Sallie Mae
Makes $28 Million Pledge. The Washington Post
,
p. B01.
Charter School Caps. (2006). Retrieved January 19, 2006 from
http://mb2.ecs.oro/reports/Report.aspx?id ::=80
Charter School Enrollment Up By 15%; Nearly One in Four Now In Charters.
Retrieved January 12, 2006 from http://www.ibcus-dccharter.ofg/news/news.asp
Chubb. J. E. & Moe, T. M. (1990). Politics
,
markets
,
and America s schools .
Washington. DC: The Brookings Institution.
Chubb, J. E. & Moe, T. M. (1992). A lesson in school reform from Great Britain.
Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
D.C. School choice incentive Act of 2003, U.S.C. § 2673 (2004).
D.C. School Reform Act of 1995. 104th Congress, 2nd sess., U.S.C. 2546 (1995).
Dewey, D. (1969). The Theory ofimperfect competition: A radical reconstruction. New
York: Columbia University Press.
Dillon, S. (October 25, 2004). Voters to decide on charter schools. The New York
Times. Retrieved on October 25, 2004 from
http://query.n vti ines.com/mem/tnt. html?orefHogin&tntget=2004/ 10/25/national
/25charter.html&tntemail0
Dobbs. M. (December 1 5, 2004). Charter vs. Traditional: Two Types of D.C. Public
School Are Not Easy to Compare. The Washington Post. Page B01.
Education Next (2001) The new education market: examining the early responses of
public schools to competition. Education Next, Winter, 2001. Retrieved on
February 20, 2005 from
http://www.fmdarticles.eom/p/articles/mi_mOMJG/is 41 /ai_87779387
Financing Excellence in the District ofColumbia Public Schools. (2005). Washington,
DC: Council of Great City Schools.
Fisher, M. (March 2, 2006). Big plans haven't produced D.C. school reform. The
Washington Post, p. B01. Retrieved on March 2, 2006 from
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/03/0 1 /AR2006030 1 023 1 2.html
137
Fiske, E. B. & Ladd, H. F. (2000). When schools compete: A cautionary tale.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution.
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: Phoenix Books.
Gaebler, T. & Osborne, D. ( 1 992). Reinventing government: How the entrepreneurial
spirit is transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison Wesley.
Government Accountability Office, 2005. D.C. charter schools: Strengthening
monitoring and process when schools close could improve accountability and
ease student transitions. GAO-06-73. Washington DC: Government
Accountability Office.
Greene, J. P. & Winters, M. A. (2006). An Evaluation of the Effects of D.C. s Voucher
Program on Public School Achievement and Racial Integration After One Year.
Retrieved February 19, 2006 from
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/sedp/files/SCDP0601.pdf
Halchin, L. E. (1999). And this parent went to market: Education as public versus
private good. In R. Maranto. S. Milliman, F. Hess, & A. Gresham (Eds.), School
choice in the real world: Lessons from Arizona charter schools
, (pp. 19-33).
Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
Henig, J. R. (1994). Rethinking school choice: Limits ofthe market metaphor.
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Henig, J. R., Hula, R. C., Orr, M. & Pedescleaux, D. S. (1999). The color ofschool
reform: Race, politics, and the challenge ofurban education. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Hirschman, A. O. (1970). Exit, voice, and loyalty’. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press.
Hoxby, C. M. (2004). Achievement in Charter Schools and Regular Public Schools in
the United States: Understanding the Differences, Harvard University and
National Bureau of Economic Research, Retrieved April 12„ 2005 at
http://post. economics, harvard.edu/faculty/hoxby/papers/hoxbycharter_dec.pdf
Hsu, S. S. (2004). How Vouchers Came to D.C. Retrieved January 13, 2006 from
http://www.educationnext.org/20044/44.html
Johnson, J. & Duffett, A. (2003). Where we are now: 12 things you need to know about
public opinion and public schools. New York: Public Agenda.
138
King, G., Keohane, R. O.. & Verba, S. (1994). Designing social inquiry. Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Krehely. J., House, M., & Kernan, E. (2004). Axis ofideology: Conservative
foundations and public policy. Washington, DC: National Committee for
Responsive Philanthropy.
Levin, H. M. (Ed.). (2001). Privatizing education: Can the school marketplace deliver
freedom ofchoice , efficiency, equity>, and social cohesion? Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Levacic, R. (1995). Local management ofschools: Analysis and practice. Buckingham,
England: Open University Press.
Levaeiaei. R. (20001 ). An analysis ofcompetition and its impact on secondary school
examination performance in England, Occasional paper no. 34. New York:
National Center for the Study of Privatization in Education.
Lin, A. C. (February 1998). Bridging Positivist and Interpretivist Approaches to
Qualitative Methods. Policy Studies Journal, 26(1), 162+. Retrieved February
16, 2005 from http://www.questia.com
Loudon, D. L. & Bitta. A. (1984). Consumer behavior: Concepts and applications.
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company.
Lowery, D. (1998). Consumer sovereignty and quasi-market failure. Journal ofPublic
Administration Research and Theory. 8(2). 137+. Retrieved April 16, 2005 from
http://www.questia.com.
Lupia. A., & McCubbins. M.D. (1998). The democratic dilemma: Can citizens learn
what they need to know? Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University
Press.
Maranto. R., Milliman, S., Hess, F., & Gresham, A. (Eds.). (1999). School Choice in the
real world: Lessonsfrom Arizona charter schools. Boulder, CO: Westview
Press.
Mead, S. (2005). Early Returns on District of Columbia Charters. Retrieved December
2005 from http://www.ppionline.org/documents/DC_Charter_1004.pdf
Metcalf, K. K. & Tait, P.A. (1999). Free Market Policies and Public Education: What Is
the Cost of Choice?. Phi Delta Kappan Sl( 1), 65. Retrieved April 16, 2005 from
http://www.questia.com
139
Miron. G. & Nelson. C. (2002). What s public about charter schools? Thousand Oaks,
CA: Corwin Press.
Moe, T. (2001). Schools, vouchers, and the American public. Washington, DC: The
Brookings Institution.
Mohammed. V. (Wednesday, April 5, 2006). Sisters are left behind. The Afro
American Newspaper
,
p. 1
.
Movement. (2005). Retrieved December 2005 from
http://www.uscharterschools.org/pub/uscs docs/o/movement.htm
National Association of Independent Schools (2003). Educational Accountability'.
Retrieved December 2, 2004 from
http://www.nais.org/about/pressrelease.cfm?ItemNumber=477
On Thin Ice: How Advocates and Opponents Could Misread the Public s Views on
Vouchers and Charter Schools. (1999). New York: Public Agenda.
Padden, J. D. (December 1 1, 1996). Market-Based Education: The New Game Has
Begun. Education Week. Retrieved April 18. 2006 from
http://www.edweek.Org/ew/articles/1996/12/l 1/I5padden.hl6.html?querystring
=market-based%20school%20reform
Pearson, J. (1993). Myths ofeducational choice. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
Perfect Information. (2001). Retrieved DATE—? from http://www.fact-
index.com/p/pe/perfect information.html
Pindyck, R. S. & Rubinfeld, D. L. (2001). Microecomics. Delhi, India: Person
Education Inc.
Pipho, C. (1998). The Evolution of School Choice. Phi Delta Kappan, 80(4), 261.
Retrieved June 18, 2004 from http://www.questia.com
Potter, W. J. (1996). An analysis ofthinking and research about qualitative methods.
Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Saulny, Susan (January 4, 2006) Students return to big changes in New Orleans, with
charter schools taking the lead. The New York Times
,
p. A 13.
Schneider, M„ Teske, P., & Marschall, M. (2000). Choosing schools: Consumer choice
and the quality ofAmerican schools. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
140
Schneider, M. (2001). Information and choice in educational privatization. In H. M.
Levin (Ed.), Privatizing education: Can the school marketplace deliver freedom
ofchoice, efficiency, equity\ and social cohesion? (pp. 72-102). Boulder, CO:
Westview Press.
Singleton, R. C. (1997). Competition policy for developing countries: A long-run,
entry-based approach. Contemporary Economic Policy, 15(2), 1-11.
Smith, K. B., & Meier, K. J. (1995). The case against school choice: Politics, markets,
andfools. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Strauss, Valerie (September 28, 2003) Private Schools Leery of Voucher Trade-Offs.
The Washington Post
,
p. C08.
Stewart, T., Wolf, P. J.. & Comman, S. Q. (2005). Parent and Student Voices on the
First Year of the DC Opportunity Scholarship Program. Retrieved on February
19, 2006 from
http://www.georgetown.edu/research/scdp/files/Parent%20and%20Student%20
Voices-Comprehensive.pdf
Sugarman, S. D. & Henig. J. R. (1999). The nature and extent of school choice. In S.D.
Sugarman & F. R. Kemerer (Eds.), School choice and social controversy
politics, policy, and lav (pp. 13-35). Washington, DC: The Brookings
Institution.
Thin, T. (1960). Theory ofmarkets. Cambridge: Flarvard University Press.
Walberg, H. J. & Bast, J. L. (2001). Understanding market-based school reform. In M.
C. Wang & H. J. Walberg (Eds.), School choice or best systems: What improves
education? (pp. 3-38). Mahwah. NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Whitty, G., Power, S., & Halpin, D. (1998). Devolution and choice in education: The
school, the state and the market. Buckingham, England: Open University Press.
Witte, J. F. (1999). Milwaukee voucher experiment, the good the bad, and the ugly. Phi
Delta Kappan, 81( 1), 59. Retrieved August 4, 2004 from
http://www.questia.com
Zajano, N. C. (1998). Voucher Program: Evaluation of Cleveland Scholarship and
Tutoring Program. Columbus, OH: legislative office of education oversight.
141







